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INTRODUCTION
The controversy over corporate control of capital markets has reached
a high point the last six years. The corporate landscape is submerged
beneath a tidal wave of mergers, acquisitions, takeovers and leveraged
buyouts. Continuous corporate expansion through mergers has pro-
duced one banner year after another. Megamergers, valued in the bil-
lions of dollars, have increased.1 A number of factors explains this
merger trend. Few people doubt that eased antitrust standards and the
Reagan administration's review procedures, employed the last six years,
are major factors.
Several theories have been advanced to explain why mergers are popu-
lar and beneficial. The principal justification is that competition in the
market for corporate control has beneficial effects on society and the
economy. First, mergers permit the movement of assets from lower- to
1. Mergers first increased substantially in the 1960's and 1970's. The period from 1968 to
1973 was a period of particularly intense merger activity. In 1969 alone, 6,107 acquisitions took
place. In comparison, while the number of mergers in 1985 was but half that of 1969, the 1985
number of 3,001 was 30-25% more than the number of transactions in the ten year period from
1975-84. But the number of transactions is not the whole picture. Important also is the dollar value
of the acquisition. For instance, while the number of 1969 mergers was double those of 1985, their
total value was only about one-seventh of that of 1985. The value of the annual transactions has
increased fourfold since 1980. The size of individual transactions has grown substantially; there
were no billion dollar transactions in the banner year of 1969. The first appeared in 1970, followed
by five between 1970 and 1978. Thereafter billion dollar transactions increased substantially: 18 in
1984, 36 in 1985, and 27 in 1986, the largest of which was $13.2 billion. Even Attorney General
Meese and Assistant Attorney General Ginsburg have conceded that the annual dollar volume of
mergers and acquisitions now has exceeded the peak reached in 1968 by 40%. This may well explain
why the market for corporate control and the attendant mergers are receiving increased attention,
See Appendix. See generally Statement of Douglas Ginsburg, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law, Committee on the Judici-
ary, U.S. House of Representatives, March 5, 1986; Statement of Edwin Meese III, Attorney Gen-
eral, before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, April 9, 1986; Statement of Charles F.
Rule, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, before the Cookware Manufacturers Association, May I,
1984; N.Y. Times, March 13, 1986, at 36, col. 2; 52 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 269-70
(Feb. 12, 1987).
One author has stated that the first billion dollar merger occurred in 1901 when United States
Steel was formed. K. DAVIDSON, MEGAMERGERS xiii (1985).
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higher-valued uses through increased efficiencies and redeployment of as-
sets. The restructuring necessitated by changing technologies often
prompts mergers. Second, mergers serve as a means to replace or disci-
pline ineffective and entrenched corporate management. Third, mergers
can produce efficiencies through joint operating agreements, economies
of scale, financial economies and economies of scope. Fourth, mergers
can provide resource and service access for both the acquiring and ac-
quired firms.2
Other theorists argue that the current merger movement is counter-
productive. Common criticisms of the effects of corporate mergers in-
clude: 1) forcing management into operating only on short-term goals
and protecting against hostile takeovers, thereby diverting management
attention; 2) damaging management and personnel morale, causing dislo-
cations in human organization; 3) misallocating financial resources of
lending institutions, "crowding out" more productive investments; 4) in-
creasing concentration and market power; 5) frequent breakup or divesti-
ture of merged firms; and 6) leveraging to finance the acquisition, which
increases the debt-equity ratio to unacceptable levels.3
2. K. DAVIDSON, supra note 1. See also IV P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 273-
88 (1980); G. BENSTON, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, REMEDIES (1980);
H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 293-300 (1985); E.T. SULLIVAN &
H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY & PROCEDURE 561-66 (1984); Baxter, Separation of
Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law" Nature ofAntitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV.
661 (1982); Carlton, Landes & Posner, Benefits & Costs of Airline Mergers: A Case Study, 11 BELL.
J. ECON. 65 (1980); Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchett in Antitrust Laws? 60 TEX. L. REV. 705 (1982);
Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust. Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts? 125 U.
PA. L REV. 1191 (1977); Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 1580 (1983); Ginsburg and Robinson, The Case Against Federal Intervention in the
Market for Corporate Control, BROOKINGS REV. 9 Winter 1986; Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic
Effects of Federal & State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. ECON. 371 (1980); Lande,
Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982); Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381 (1980); Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evo-
lutions, Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1537 (1981); Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust
Defense: Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977); Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and The Limits
of Antitrust, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 105 (1969); Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: Reply,
59 AM. ECON. REV. 954 (1969); Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
TradeOffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968); Williamson, Economics As An Antitrust Defense: Correc-
tion and Reply, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 1372 (1968); Discussion, Capitalism and Monopolistic Competi-
tion: I The Theory of Oligopoly, 40-2 AM. ECON. REV. 63, 64. (1950) (remarks of Joe S. Bain).
3. See generally R. RUMELT, STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(1974); Drucker, Corporate Takeovers--What Is To Be Done?, 82 PUBLIC INTEREST 3, 12-13 (1986);
Firth, The Profitability of Takeovers and Mergers, 89 ECON. J. 316 (1979); Scherer, Takeovers: Pres-
ent and Future Dangers, BROOKINGS REV. 15 Winter 1986; Weston & Smith, Further Evaluations of
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The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is charged with
the responsibility of challenging mergers which have a reasonable
probability of substantially lessening competition or tending to create a
monopoly.' Merger enforcement has not always been consistent, how-
ever, varying with administration agendas and economic theories. For
example, from the inception of the Clayton Act in 1914 until major revi-
sion of the statute in 1950, the Department of Justice brought only six-
teen merger cases.5 Over the next decade only twenty-seven mergers
were challenged by the government. In 1968, the highpoint of its en-
forcement activity, the Department filed twenty-four cases.6 In the first
five years of the Reagan Administration, the Antitrust Division chal-
lenged only twenty-six mergers out of over 10,000 merger applications.7
Thirteen of those challenged cases resulted in resolution through the en-
try of consent decrees.'
Serious concern has been expressed in several quarters, including the
Federal Reserve Board,9 about the present relaxed standards governing
antitrust enforcement. The Antitrust Division continues to advance a
merger policy which, it asserts, "distinguishes more clearly between
procompetitive, efficiency-enhancing mergers on the one hand, and merg-
ers that create a significant probability of increasing prices to consumers,
on the other."1° But whatever economic policy the Department of Jus-
tice selects as its benchmark for the interpretation of the legal merger
standards, one of the most interesting and controversial issues of merger
law today is the public ordering or means of resolving merger conflicts.
This Article focuses on the Antitrust Division's actual enforcement
techniques for resolving merger disputes, rather than the underlying eco-
nomic policy which favors or disfavors large mergers. Although the eco-
Conglomerate Performance, J. Bus. RES. 5 (1977); Statement of Charles F. Rule, supra note 1, at 5-
10.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
5. Statement of Charles F. Rule, supra note 1, at 3 n.1.
6. Id.
7. Solomon, Administration Hopes to Extend the Reagan Revolution to Antitrust Laws, NAT'L
J. Jan. 18, 1986, at 144; Memorandum to Cabinet Councils on Changes In Antitrust Laws dated
Nov. 8, 1985, 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 946, 947 (1985); 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 483 (1986).
8. 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 946 (1985). The 26 suits break down as follows: 5
in 1981, 7 in 1982, 2 in 1983, 4 in 1984, and 8 in 1985. On five other occasions the threat of a suit
was sufficient to terminate proposed acquisitions.
9. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1985, § 3, Col. 2, at 1.
10. Statement of Edwin Meese III, supra note 1, at 1.
[Vol. 64:997
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nomic policy employed to interdict corporate takeovers and its
distributional effects are obviously important public policy inquiries,
equally important, and no less controversial, is the process or procedure
by which the Antitrust Division interprets and enforces its statutory
mandate. "
The thesis of this Article is that the Antitrust Division has changed
from a traditional, litigation-oriented enforcement agency to a regulatory
agency. The Antitrust Division, as an economic regulator, has adopted a
negotiational rather than an adversarial posture. The result is an avoid-
ance of lengthy and costly adversarial litigation in exchange for a more
efficient resolution of merger issues. The change is not merely proce-
dural. It has important implications for enforcement policy, compliance
incentives, and substantive law. For example, the present administration
uses the review process to favor market deregulation. Another adminis-
tration in Washington may decide that the review process also permits a
pervasive industrial policy. The review process analyzed here could
serve either ideology. For that reason, a careful analysis of the present
process is in order.
Although the new policy may result in more cost-efficient enforce-
ment, a regulatory role for the Antitrust Division is antithetical to the
original intention of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Nevertheless, the
transition has occurred, and at times Congress has sanctioned or ratified,
at least implicitly or through inaction,' 2 this enforcement transition.
11. The process by which the Antitrust Division resolves acquisition conflicts may be outcome-
determinative of the issues; thus selection of conflict resolution process may preordain the result.
But the regulatory process is broad enough to facilitate either deregulation or a pervasive industrial
policy. Ideology could dictate either result.
The fact that the present administration favors deregulation and self-correcting markets does not
undercut the conclusion that the merger review process at the Antitrust Division is a form of regula-
tion. That a regulator exercises regulatory authority benignly does not mean that one is not a regula-
tor. The character or structure of the process dictates the classification. Few would doubt that the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, or the Federal Trade
Commission are regulatory agencies, even though they now operate under a deregulation philoso-
phy. See infra text accompanying notes 224.
12. On the use of congressional inaction or the exercise of congressional oversight as an implied
congressional ratification, cf North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 533-35 (1982); Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 290-306 (1981); Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974); Power Reactor Dev.
Co. %. International Union of Elec., R. & M.W., 367 U.S. 396 (1960); Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft
Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954); United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153
(1953); Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341 (1932); United States v. Jackson, 280 U.S. 183 (1930);
Clayton v Utah Territory, 132 U.S. 632 (1890).
The constitutional question whether the Antitrust Division is engaged in a lawful delegation of
Number 4] 1001
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Now that the transition from a traditional, enforcement-oriented agency
to an economic regulator has occurred, and can be clearly demonstrated
in the context of the current corporate-takeover wave, it is time for Con-
gress to evaluate this enforcement transition.
This Article attempts to explicate the tensions created by the Antitrust
Division's regulatory posture. Section I of this Article reviews the origi-
nal intention of the drafters of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Section II
identifies classical models of regulation. Section III describes and ana-
lyzes specific procedures and rules followed by the Division. That sec-
tion demonstrates how the Division has changed its enforcement posture
to that of a de faqto regulator, consistent with recognized models of regu-
lation and more recent legislative action. Finally, section IV concludes
with an analysis of how the Division's present review procedures enhance
efficiency and clarity in the law and how they are consistent with and
supported by the emerging trend of alternative dispute resolution.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. The Sherman Act
Congress considered the first antitrust bills in 1888.13 Senator Sher-
man, sponsor of the principal bill, argued that Congress could regulate
trusts only through its taxing power; later he broadened his argument,
claiming that Congress had authority to regulate under the commerce
clause. 14 After two years of debate, Congress adopted the Sherman Anti-
trust Act in 1890. The original text contained eight sections, including
civil and criminal enforcement provisions.
Congress intended that courts should interpret the Sherman Act on a
case-by-case basis within the context of the common-law principles and
executive powers envisioned by Congress is beyond the scope of this article. This issue may go even
beyond the recent Supreme Court delegation cases. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 54 U.S.L.W. 5064
(U.S. July 7, 1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
13. A committee of the House of Representatives conducted early investigations of monopolies
in 1888. See Report of Investigations of Trusts, H.R. REP. vol. IX, No. 3112, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1887-88). See also 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890); 19 CONG. REC. 7512 (1888); 19 CONG. REc. 6041
(1888).
14. E.T. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY & PROCEDURE 25 (1984);
W. LETWIN, LAW & ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 87-90 (1965). See also 21 CONG. REc. 2599
(1890); A. NEALE & D. GRAYER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. (3d ed. 1980); H.
THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1954).
[Vol. 64:997
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precedents. The statute contained only very general, substantive princi-
ples and created public offenses and private causes of action against re-
straints of trade and monopolizations. Importantly, the new legislation
gave the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction. At common law, if
restraints were found unreasonable, courts considered the restraints void
and unenforceable. Under the Sherman Act, however, a private suit for
treble damages could be maintained, and the federal government could
bring criminal actions for fines and imprisonment or civil actions for in-
junctive relief.
Originally, jurisdiction to institute proceedings on behalf of the gov-
ernment rested with the Attorney General's office.15 From 1903 until
1933, an Assistant Attorney General within the Department of Justice
had authority to enforce the antitrust law. The Antitrust Division was
not established until 1933.16
A review of the legislative debates preceding the passage of the Sher-
man Act indicates that there was very little, if any, discussion about the
role of the Department of Justice. 17 Debate centered largely around the
constitutionality of the proposed legislation and the dislike for trusts,
combinations and monopolies. 8 The Senate Judiciary Committee
drafted the final bill, largely through the work of Senators Edmunds,
George, Hoar and Evarts. 19 The final bill, similar to Senator Sherman's
earlier proposal, contained more severe penalties2 ° and gave the Attorney
General responsibility over the public enforcement provisions. The
drafters expressed no doubts that the Attorney General had authority to
enforce the law.2 As one congressman noted during the floor debate:
[The Sherman Act] invokes the equity side, the greatest restraining power
15. 21 CONG. REc. 2570 (1890); White, Introduction, Commemorating the Tenth Anniversary of
the Economic Policy Office of the Antitrust Division, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 1-2 (1985).
16. Id. The Economic Policy Office of the Antitrust Division was formally established in 1973.
17. 21 CONG. REc. 2456, 3148 (1890). At least two commentators have argued that "the bill
which was arduously debated was never passed, and that the bill which was passed was never really
discussed." W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION 11 (1940). See also A. WALKER,
HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW 1-62 (1910).
18. Id. See also W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 91-95.
19. W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 94. See also W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, supra note 17, at 8-10
(1940).
20, W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 94. Compare W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, supra note 17, at 9-
10 with A. WALKER, supra note 17, at 27.
21. See W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 100 (citing N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1892, at 4, col. 2: "Let
the officers charged with the enforcement of the law do their full duty and Trusts and combinations
will go to pieces as quickly as they sprang into existence" (quoting Senator Edmunds)). See also 21
CONG. REc. 2569 (1890).
Number 4] 1003
Washington University Open Scholarship
1004 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 64:997
of the court, and it makes it the duty of United States district attorneys
under the direction of the Attorney General, to go upon the equity side of
the court and invoke the strong hand of the chancellor, backed by the
whole power of the United States...
But the Sherman Act Congress gave little attention to the question of
how discretion to enforce the law, either public or private, should be
exercised.23 One retrospective report to the Congress in 1940 observed:
Nor was there an attempt to devise new machinery of enforcement. In
the thought of the nineties the law should be as nearly self-enforcing as
possible. The main reliance seems to have been placed upon the private
suit. A man knew when he was hurt better than an agency or government
above could tell him. Make it worth their while-as the triple-damage
clause was intended to do--and injured members could be depended upon
to police an industry. If more were needed, the resort was to the usual
course of Federal justice. Another duty was added to the overlarge obliga-
tions of the Attorney General and of the several district attorneys scattered
throughout the land.24
As presidential administrations changed over the years, enforcement
of the antitrust laws also changed. In the early years after the adoption
of the Sherman Act, public enforcement of the act took the form of litiga-
tion, not regulation.25 This early policy interpretation is consistent with
the scant legislative history on point, which suggests that Congress did
22. A. WALKER, supra note 14, at 39, 59-60 (citing 21 CONG. REc. 4099 (1890)).
23. W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, supra note 17, at 10.
24. Id.
Section [sic] 4 and 5 of the Sherman law confer jurisdiction in equity upon the several
Circuit Courts of the United States to prevent and restrain violation of the Sherman law in
pursuance of petitions presented by the district attorneys of the United States under the
direction of the attorney general of the United States on behalf of the United States. Those
two sections contain a few special directions for guidance of such proceedings....
A. WALKER, supra note 17, at 59.
As one commentator opined 20 years after the statute's enactment:
It therefore follows that whenever it becomes the duty of a particular district attorney of
the United States to institute proceedings in equity for the purpose of stopping a particular
combination from continuing past violation of Section 1 of the Sherman law, it also be-
comes the duty of the same district attorney to institute and prosecute proceedings to ac-
complish the seizure, condemnation and forfeiture of whatever property was the subject of
the combination ... Moreover, such forfeiture proceedings, under Section 6 of the Sher-
man law, should always follow or accompany any indictment under Section I of that
statute.
A. WALKER, supra note 17, at 60-61.
25. W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 103-42. The Sherman Act could control the trusts, Senator
Edmunds said, "if the officers of the Government having charge of the enforcement of law under-
stand their duty and are willing to do it, being, of course, supplied with sufficient means to put it into
force." Id. at 142 (citing Letter from Edmunds to Sleicher, Jan. 2, 1903 in 36 CONG. REC. 1901
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss4/2
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not intend to establish a regulatory agency to enforce the legislative
scheme.26 That the Department did not enforce the statute regularly or
consistently throughout its early life does not undercut the statute's liti-
gation focus. Irregular enforcement was not due to a lack of authoriza-
tion or statutory clarity, but rather to discretion and budget
constraints.27 In subsequent years enforcement mechanisms were
(1903)). See also W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, supra note 17, at 34, 121-43; A. WALKER, supra note 17,
at 63-162, 167.
26. See IX A. BICKEL, THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1910-21, 130 (1984)
("The Sherman Act, ... was a method of regulation by lawsuit."); Rabin, Federal Regulation in
Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1216 (1986)) ("In 1890 Congress passed the Sherman
Act. In doing so, however, Congress chose not to establish an administrative agency as a means of
implementing its regulatory scheme.").
27. W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 103-42; W. HAMILTON & 1. TILL, supra note 17, at 27-35.
See also 47 CONG. REc. 4183, 4185 (1908); D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 143-
49, 156 (1959); H.B. THORELLI, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 181, 215, 565 (1955).
Prior to the administration of Theodore Roosevelt in 1901, only 18 federal antitrust suits were
filed during the administrations of Harrison, Cleveland and McKinley. 47 CONG. REC. 4183, 4186
(1908). W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, supra note 17, at 135; A. WALKER, supra note 17, at 164. During
this same time only 22 private actions were litigated under the Sherman Act. A. WALKER, supra
note 17, at 81, 113, 122, 161. Harrison Administration: 6 government suits, 3 private suits; Cleve-
land Administration: 8 government suits, 8 private suits; McKinley Administration: 4 government
suits, 11 private suits. The United States government was successful in 10 of the 18 cases it brought
during this period. A. WALKER, supra note 17, at 164-65. Six years after the Sherman Act became
law, the House of Representatives requested, in resolution form, the Attorney General to report
what steps the Department of Justice had taken in enforcing the Sherman law. The request implied
that enforcement of the statute was being neglected. Id. at 167.
Under the federal system, a prosecutor has discretion to decide what charges to institute, when to
file suit and where suits should be brought. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-25
(1979) (government free to prosecute under any statute defendant violates, without regard to pen-
alty, provided prosecution not discriminatory); United States v. Mayo, 705 F.2d 62, 77 (2d Cir.
1983); United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 628 n.13 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (executive has
discretion to decide which charge to bring) (quoting Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480
(D.C. Cir. 1967)). See generally A. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DIS-
CRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA (1981); M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES
OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978); F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE
DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1970); D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DE-
TERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966). See also United States v. Bag-
nell, 679 F.2d 826, 830-33 (11th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1047 (1983) (prosecutor has
discretion to determine in which district to bring charges); United States v. Lavasco, 431 U.S. 783,
796 (1977); cf United States v. Kendrick, 692 F.2d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
914 (1983). See generally United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (decision whether to
prosecute generally within prosecutor's discretion); United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 628-29
(5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (executive is absolute judge of whether prosecution should be initiated);
United States v. Sade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1135 (1st Cir. 1981) (executive exercises broad discretion in
deciding whether to prosecute); United States v. Girst, 645 F.2d 1014, 1015-16 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per
curiam).
Discretion exists by virtue of the prosecutor's role as a member of the Executive Branch of the
Washington University Open Scholarship
1006 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 64:997
strengthened.
B. Legislative Activity Prior to the Passage of the Clayton Act
As noted above, from the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 until the
start of Roosevelt administration at the turn of the twentieth century, the
Attorney General brought relatively few federal enforcement actions. As
early as 1882 Roosevelt considered antitrust an important issue, but
when he took office in 1901 he had not formulated an antitrust policy.
Only later did he take the lead in advocating strong enforcement. 28
The Department of Justice filed its first case under the Roosevelt ad-
ministration, United States v. Northern Securities, in 1902.29 Shortly
thereafter, Roosevelt proposed a national regulatory statute: "In the in-
terest of the whole people, the nation should, without interfering with the
power of the States in the matter itself, also assume power of supervision
and regulation over all corporations doing an interstate business. '30
While he was increasing the prosecutions substantially,3I he also became
the first to advocate a regulatory agency for antitrust. However,
Roosevelt's proposal clearly indicated that he did not envision the De-
partment of Justice in the role of economic regulator.
The first regulatory effort was the creation of the Bureau of Corpora-
tions in 1903.32 Roosevelt wanted the Bureau to investigate corporations
and report its findings to the administration. The Bureau's first effort
government which is charged, under the Constitution, with ensuring that the laws of the United
States are "faithfully executed." U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3. See Noler v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679
n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In interpreting this discretion, courts frequently draw distinctions between
the decision to file a lawsuit or the decision to dismiss the case. Id. (citing United States v. Am-
midown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). See also United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976). When the distinction is recognized, prosecutors generally
are required to obtain judicial approval before the prosecutions can be terminated. The United
States Department of Justice has summarized appropriate consideration to be weighed and desirable
practices to be followed in discharging prosecutorial responsibilities. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRIN-
CIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION (July 1980), reprinted in 27 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3277 (1980).
It is this article's thesis that the current role played by the Antitrust Division goes beyond tradi.
tional prosecutorial discretion.
28. H.B. THORELLI, supra note 14, at 412-15. W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 196, 200.
29. 193 U.S. 197 (1904). See also United States v. Swift & Co., 195 U.S. 375 (1905) (filed in
1902).
30. W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 205, 239. See also H. THORELLI, supra note 14, at 420.
31. W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 240; see also W. HAMILTON AND I. TILL, supra note 17, at
135-36.
32. Act of Feb. 14, 1903, 32 U.S. Stat. 827, 57th Cong., 2d Sess.
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centered on investigating the "Beef Trust."3 3 It had investigative author-
ity to act as an adjunct to the Department and to publicize business con-
duct. Relations between the Bureau and the Department were not
always smooth; nor was dual cooperation consistent.
34
Since Roosevelt continued to perceive the Department's primary duty
as litigation, he pressed for expanded regulatory authority for the Bu-
reau. "To attempt to control these corporations by lawsuits means to
impose upon both the Department of Justice and the courts an impossi-
ble burden."35 Roosevelt, therefore, called for a strengthened regulatory
framework within the Bureau of Corporations36 urging that an expert
commission with supervisory power over firms engaged in interstate
commission was needed. He called for regulation "by an executive body,
and not merely by means of lawsuits."' 37 Although a bill to accomplish
Roosevelt's objectives was introduced in Congress in 1908, it lost support
after long debate.3 8
The presidential campaign of 1908 saw the Democrats propose, among
other changes to the Sherman Act, a federal licensing system. This li-
censing system would have required an interstate corporation "to take
out a Federal license before it [was] permitted to control as much as
twenty-five percent of the product in which it deals." "[T]he license [was
designed] to protect the public from watered stock and to prohibit the
control by such corporation of more than fifty percent of the total
amount of any product consumed in the United States."39 President
Taft, Roosevelt's successor, proposed a similar form of antitrust
regulation.
Instead of proposing amendment of the Sherman Act, Taft urged the
establishment of compulsory federal incorporation of interstate busi-
ness.' Under his proposal, the Department of Commerce would have
had authority to regulate stock purchases, to prohibit companies from
33. United States v. Swift & Co., 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
34. W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 240-44.
35. Id. at 245. See also H.B. THORELLI, supra note 14, at 431.
36. W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 246. But cf. H.B. THORELLI, supra note 14, at 430.
37. W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 246. See also 42 CoNG. REc. 3853-54 (1908); H.B.
THORELLI, supra note 14, at 551-54.
38. W. LETWIN, supra note 14 at 247-50.
39. Id. at 251.
40. Id. at 252. See also IX A. BICKEL, supra note 26, at 95, 128. The federal incorporation
statute would provide: "a means, without great financial disturbance, of changing the character,
organization, and extent of ... business into one within the lines of the law under Federal control
and supervision, securing compliance with the antitrust statute." Id.
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holding stock in other corporations except upon prior approval, and to
require certain disclosures.4 Later, after the Supreme Court decided
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,42 Taft amended his federal incorpora-
tion proposal to provide for supervision by "an executive tribunal of the
dignity and power of the Comptroller of the Currency or the Interstate
Commerce Commission."43 Taft's Attorney General, who had negoti-
ated final decrees in major antitrust cases, supported this idea. Attorney
General Wickersham said:
It is not right that the Attorney General should be subjected to the respon-
sibility of deciding ... whether or not a proposed plan of disintegration of
an individual combination would restore lawful combination. The ques-
tions involved are economic; they depend upon information which we can
not have in this department; and it was a mere chance that the Bureau of
Corporations had investigated, and, therefore, was possessed of facts which
enabled it to come to the assistance of the Department of Justice in this
particular instance.44
The Standard Oil decision had a major impact on subsequent legisla-
tion, which substantially broadened the Department's enforcement re-
sponsibility. Before Standard Oil, Taft, as a federal judge deciding
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,45 had held that the "rule of
reason" analysis only applied to ancillary restraints, not to direct re-
straints such as price fixing, which he characterized as "naked re-
straints." For Taft, direct restraints were per se illegal regardless of their
reasonableness.
In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court rejected Taft's interpretation of
the coverage of the Sherman Act. Chief Justice White's opinion for the
Supreme Court in Standard Oil, adopted a rule of reason analysis signifi-
cantly broader than Judge Taft's standard. White's majority opinion ap-
plied a rule of reason analysis to direct, as well as ancillary, restraints in
determining the "reasonableness" of the restraint. Only "unreasonable"
or "undue" restraints of trade were illegal under the Standard Oil view.
Applying the newly articulated standard, White found the defendants in
Standard Oil guilty of engaging in unreasonable restraints of trade. Ac-
cordingly, the Court ordered dissolution of Standard Oil.
Immediately after the decision in Standard Oil, critics attacked the
41. IX A. BICKEL, supra note 26, at 128.
42. 221 U.S. I (1911).
43. IX A. BICKEL, supra note 26, at 128.
44. Id.
45. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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Court, charging that White's broader analysis might weaken the statute
and broaden the discretion of the judiciary. The critics denounced the
new standard as vague. They feared that the Sherman Act's effectiveness
in controlling trusts, combinations and monopolies would be diluted.46
As a result, numerous congressional proposals urged the creation of a
business court or expert commission that would license the whole range
of business decisions from "capitalization to ... business practices."'47
Congress viewed the Sherman Act, with its newly announced standard,
as merely a "method of regulation by lawsuit,"48 too uncertain to be re-
garded seriously. No congressional consensus emerged on the proposals,
however, until after the presidential elections of 1912. The statutory
amendments that followed radically changed the nature of the Depart-
ment of Justice's authority.
C. The Adoption of the Clayton Act and Direct Control Over Mergers
The debate in Congress in 1911-12 and the political speeches sur-
rounding the campaign of 1912 demonstrated that few people, if any, in
positions of authority believed that the Department of Justice's antitrust
enforcement mandate extended beyond filing lawsuits and litigating
cases.49 After the Standard Oil decision, which broadened judicial dis-
cretion, the call became even stronger for supplemental antitrust legisla-
tion, the creation of a regulatory agency, and the rejection of the idea of
federal incorporation. After President Wilson took office in 1912, these
proposals became reality.
The legislative debates leading to changes in the antitrust laws began
in 1913. Senator Cummins presented three proposals.50 The first two
provided for a Bureau of Corporations as a separate administrative
46. E.T. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 14, at 36-37.
47. IX A. BICKEL, supra note 26, at 130.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. IX A. BICKEL, supra note 26, at 129; W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 267-73; D. Dewey,
supra note 27, at 150-51. Attorney General Harmon, in his report submitted to Congress, strongly
supported the use of court litigation as the means of antitrust enforcement, but felt that the detection
of possible violations and evidence accumulation should be placed within another bureau. 47 CONG.
REC. 4183, 4186. Harmon stressed the need for liberal appropriations and effective organization of
prosecutions for Department enforcement of the Sherman Act. Id.
50. 49 CONG. REc. 4126 (1913). The Committee on Interstate Commerce said:
First ... the [Sherman Act] should stand as the fundamental law upon the subject and...
any supplemental legislation ... should be in harmony with the purpose of the existing
statute. Second ... it is neither necessary nor desirable at this time to provide for the
organization under act of Congress of industrial corporations.... Third... it is desirable
to impose upon corporation [sic] now or hereafter organized under State law, and engaged
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agency. The third proposal would have permitted a preclearance ap-
proval or disapproval of proposed mergers. 'The purpose was to facilitate
"administrative" ease and efficiency in the enforcement of the antitrust
laws.51 Senator Cummins offered the proposals in the hope that they
would regulate competition,52 and aid the Department of Justice in its
enforcement task.53 The Committee to which these matters were re-
ferred was unable, however, to recommend specific legislation. 4
Throughout the election campaign and in his first year in office, Presi-
dent Wilson urged the adoption of supplemental legislation. In general,
Wilson shared Senator Cummins' agenda. He proposed a more explicit
statute that would prohibit specific types of conduct and urged the crea-
tion of a new regulatory trade commission. Wilson favored a regulatory
commission to serve as an expert fact finder to help shape dissolution and
divestiture decrees.55 Importantly, however, Wilson disapproved of
Cummins' proposal to permit a premerger approval or disapproval
procedure.56
The President believed that the premerger approval process was
flawed. Specifically, he feared that a premerger, advisory opinion (which
had been used twice in the Roosevelt administration) would bind the
or proposing to engage in such commerce, further conditions or regulations affecting both
their organization and the conduct of their business....
Id.
51. Id. See also S. REP. No. 1326, 62nd Cong., 3d Sess. 11 (1913).
52. W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 269.
53. 49 CONG. REC. 4127 (1913).
The Department of Justice will ignore a great many unlawful transactions because there
will be doubt as to whether the interference... is direct or indirect.... The committee...
contents itself now with a statement of its conclusion that there should be further legisla-
tion specifically prohibiting certain forms of associations, combinations, or monopoly
which admittedly restrain trade and commerce.., but which may be held by the courts to
be indirect or remote interferences.
Id.
54. 49 CONG. REc. 4126 (1913); W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 270.
55. W. LETWIN, supra note 14 at 270-73; IX A. BICKEL, supra note 26, at 143.
56. 51 CONG. REC. 1962-63 (1914).
What we are proposing to do, therefore, is, happily, not to hamper or interfere with busi-
ness as enlightened business men prefer to do it, or in any sense to put it under the ban.
The antagonism between business and government is over. We are now about to give ex-
pression to the best business judgment of America, to what we know to be the business
conscience and honor of the land. The Government and business men are ready to meet
each other halfway in a common effort to square business methods with both public opin-
ion and the law.
Id. at 1963. "[[Ihe opinion of the country] would not wish to see [a commission] empowered to
make terms with monopoly or in any sort to assume control of business, as if the Government made
itself responsible." W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 270-73.
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government and give the impression that the government was working
"with" firms to effect business mergers. 7 Wilson rejected the notion of a
government and business "partnership". He expressed, however, his de-
sire to provide the Department of Justice with "guidance and informa-
tion" from an administrative body acting as a "clearing house for
information."58 In fact, the regulatory commission finally approved by
the Congress had broader powers than Wilson, or his advisor Brandeis,
had ever advocated.
Out of compromise in 1914 came two legislative enactments: the Clay-
ton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. Each spoke, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, of the role played by the Department of Justice in
the merger area. First, the Clayton Act,5 9 in a marked departure from
the Sherman Act, explicitly prohibited certain practices, including cer-
tain mergers. Section seven of the Clayton Act prohibited stock acquisi-
tions or mergers that might "substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce."'  Although this vague
standard of legality afforded judges little guidance, the legislative history
clearly indicated a congressional desire "to arrest the creation of trusts
... in their incipiency and before consummation."'" Otherwise, the
open-endedness of the standard defied specificity and clarity. Even
though the House and Senate were aware of textual ambiguities, the
spirit of compromise enjoined the membership from being more spe-
cific. 62 Congress made no provision for preclearance of mergers by the
Department of Justice or the newly created regulatory agency, the Fed-
57. W. LETWIN, supra note 14, at 270-73. Cummins, recognizing that such a new agency
would hold "quasi-judicial" functions and perform a policy role, believed that it could be more
efficient than the courts. As discussed infra at § III, this was the forerunner to the Department of
Justice's premerger notification program in place today.
58. 51 CONG. REC. 1963 (1914). "It demands such a commission only... as a clearinghouse
for the facts by which both the public mind and the managers of great business undertakings should
be guided.... " Id. This was similar to the proposal made by Attorney General Harmon in 1896.
See supra note 49.
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1982).
60 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
61. H.R. 15657. 63rd Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
62. H.R. 1142, 63rd Cong. 2d Sess. 18-29 (1914). The Conference Committee Report amplified
why Congress was unable to add specificity: "It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all
unfair practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field .... If Congress were to
adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an endless task." See also 51 CONG. REC. 10376
(1914) (statement of Senator Newlands discussing the roles of the Department of Justice and the
newly emerging regulatory agency); A. BICKEL, supra note 26, at 143.
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eral Trade Commission. Wilson, and not Cummins, had prevailed on
this major issue.
The legislative history underlying the creation of the Federal Trade
Commission illustrates how Congress viewed the Department of Justice
at the time. The debates made clear that a new regulatory commission
would introduce new investigative tools and an administrative "body of
law" necessary to make antitrust enforcement more effective. 3 The Sen-
ate Committee observed that many of the present antitrust problems
could have been avoided if a regulatory commission, not the Department
of Justice, initially had been entrusted with the enforcement of the Sher-
man Act. The Committee noted that changes in administrations had
caused inherent problems in the Attorney General's office."4 The Com-
mittee favored a separate administrative agency in part because it be-
lieved that the public was not ready for a sharp swing in enforcement as
carried out by the Department of Justice. Thus, while maintaining the
Department's law enforcement role under the Sherman Act, Congress
created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for the purpose of estab-
lishing a framework for the regulation of corporations engaged in inter-
state commerce.65
Congress gave the FTC investigative and fact finding authority, as well
as the power to issue cease and desist orders against "unfair methods of
competition." The Commission would define those terms as it enforced
the new act 66 because Congress had declined to offer helpful guidance.
Congress expected the Department and the Commission to assess differ-
ent penalties: criminal penalties by the Department in its traditional role
as prosecutor and regulatory penalties by the Commission for controlling
or adjusting markets.
63. 51 CONG. REC. 10376 (1914).
64. Id. at 10376, 14520-26.
65. Id. at 11083. Senator Newlands, who reported for the Committee on Interstate Commerce,
said that the purpose of the regulatory commission was to aid the courts and the Attorney General
"in framing and enforcing decrees dissolving corporations," to aid in "the enforcement of the Sher-
man Act" and to be free from "changing incumbency" of the Attorney General's office. He opined
that powers of the new trade commission "are not greatly in excess of those now possessed and for
years exercised by the Bureau of Corporations." 51 CONG. REc. 10376 (1914).
66. H.R. 1142, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 18-29 (1914). The Conference Committee reported: "It is
now generally recognized that the only effective means of establishing and maintaining monopoly ...
is the use of unfair competition. The more certain way to stop monopoly at the threshold is to
prevent unfair competition." See also supra note 49.
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D. Subsequent Amendments of the Antitrust Laws Affecting the
Department of Justice Enforcement
In 1950 Congress amended section seven of the Clayton Act to cover
asset, as well as stock, acquisitions. The difficult burden of proof estab-
lished in United States v. Columbia Steel Co.67 for challenging mergers
under the Sherman Act motivated Congress to amend section seven.68 A
review of the Celler-Kefauver debates indicates that the enforcement re-
sponsibilities of the Antitrust Division were not debated, although Sena-
tor Kefauver inserted in the Congressional Record a reference that
recognized the Department's role in "policing business and industry.969
In 1955 a special committee set up by the Attorney General published
an in-depth study of the antitrust laws.7° The committee wanted to pro-
vide "a thoughtful and comprehensive study" of the antitrust laws be-
cause sixty-four years had elapsed since passage of the Sherman Act. Its
charge was to recommend to "enforcement agencies, Congress and the
courts" a "future guide" for decisions. Among other recommendations,
the committee suggested that section seven of the Clayton Act authorize
the Department of Justice to utilize procedures for prior clearance of
proposed mergers. Objections from the minority members focused on a
strict interpretation of the Department's role as a prosecutorial body
with no premerger clearance authority."1 The committee's recommenda-
tions included the possible use of investigatory tools, such as Civil Inves-
67. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
68. Compare Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. 495 (1948), with United States v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 592-97 (1957). In DuPont, the Court held:
that any acquisition by one corporation of all or any part of the stock of another corpora-
tion, competitor or not, is within the reach of the section whenever the reasonable likeli-
hood appears that the acquisition will result in a restraint of commerce or in the creation of
a monopoly of any line of commerce.... The Clayton Act was intended to supplement the
Sherman Act. Its aim was primarily to arrest apprehended consequences ofintercorporate
relationships before those relationships could work their evil, which may be at or any time
after the acquisition, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case ....
Id. at 592-97 (emphasis added).
69. 96 CONG. REC. 16454 (1950) (quoting from the St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 24, 1947: "But
whether the current Congress enacts few or many regulator measures, the problem of policing busi-
ness and industry steadily grows bigger, even under existing laws. Much of this responsibility falls
on the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice...).
70. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE iv, (1955). The Committee believed that antitrust policy represented the
"distinctive American means for assuring the competitive economy on which our political and social
freedom under representative government in part depend[s]." Id. at 2.
71. Id. at 3. In 1914, Senator Cummins had proposed a similar pre-merger clearance or screen-
ing process which failed to reach floor debate. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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tigative Demands (CID's), which the Department had requested to aid in
the production of evidence for litigation.72 The committee distinguished
the CID investigatory tool, which it recommended for the Department,
from the investigatory subpoena power granted to the FTC. The com-
mittee wanted the Department to be able to obtain the information neces-
sary to perform its enforcement function and to determine whether to file
suit, but it did not wish to give the Department extra-judicial enforce-
ment authority. Moreover, the committee refused to create the full pano-
ply of procedural mechanisms necessary when subpoenas are authorized
to regulatory agencies in the performance of their functions. The 1962
Antitrust Civil Process Act eventually embodied these views.73
The hearings on the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975 concerning
pre-merger notification and expanded CID use illustrate continued con-
cerns about the role of the Department.74 Lewis Engman, then FTC
Chairman, expressed the view that the proposed pre-merger notification
might get the Antitrust Division (and the Commission) into the business
of "controlling" mergers rather than "maintaining their proper role to
enforce the antitrust laws."'75 The FTC Chairman felt the standards es-
tablished under the FTC pre-merger program would be sufficient if Con-
gress also mandated a sixty-day waiting period before the merger
proceeded.76
72. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITrEE, supra note 70, at 348.
73. Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, 76 Stat. 548 (1962); 15 U.S.C. § 1311-1314
(1982). The Department received authority in 1962 to issue CID's under the following guidelines:
(1) only non-natural persons under investigation for civil violations of antitrust laws could be served;
(2) only documents could be demanded-no one could be compelled to give oral testimony. See also
15 U.S.C. § 49 (1982).
74. Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Mo.
nopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1975).
75. Id. Engman believed that full investigation of all mergers exceeding the $100 million assets
or sales test contained in the bill would be counterproductive. Although he used the terminology
"proper role to enforce the antitrust laws," he was using that terminology for both the Department
and FTC. He did not appear to question whether the Department and FTC should have the same
pre-merger notification requirements. Rather, Engman seemed to believe that the threshold test for
which corporations would be required to submit notice might be so low as to (1) create administra-
tive costs for the Department and FTC to fully investigate as required and (2) bring within the
Department and FTC scrutiny more business activities that are not violative of antitrust laws, with
the result that the agencies are in fact "controlling" business rather than enforcing laws.
76. Id. at 72. Thus, while Engman clearly supported the view that the Department's role under
the antitrust laws is only prosecution, his statements do not indicate that he believed granting in-
creased CID or premerger notice to the Department necessarily altered that role or function. His
primary concern, which seemed to apply to the FTC as well, appeared to be whether government
should bring so many mergers or acquisitions under review at all.
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The Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division, Thomas
Kauper, also testified on the proposals. 7 Commenting on the Depart-
ment's role before regulatory agencies, where it gives advice on competi-
tion issues, Kauper characterized the use of CID's as "clearly . . .
advantageous," but added that the Department's primary duty remained
law enforcement. He distinguished the Department's role as an enforcer
and prosecutor from the role of the FTC as a regulator and "policy
maker."78 However, he pointed out that in recent years the Antitrust
Division, subject to delegated authority from the Attorney General, had
become "one of the prime advocates of competition policy before the fed-
eral regulatory agencies." He added that "[t]his activity is increasing
and becoming ever more important.79
Thus, Congress became aware of the Antitrust Division's increasing
involvement, through its competition advocacy program, in the regula-
tory affairs of other agencies and of the possibility that preclearance
merger procedures would further involve the Department in the business
of economic regulation.
Congressional debate on the Antitrust Improvements Act carried over
into 1976. Again, the Judiciary Committee advanced strong statements
about the boundaries of the Antitrust Division's authority. 80 The minor-
77. Id. at 70. Kauper endorsed the 1962 Civil Process Act, and the considerations supporting
its enactment, but he testified that the Department's experience since that time had shown that "the
limited scope of the Act substantially impairs our investigative effectiveness." Id. at 91. Among the
bill's provisions, Kauper favored, inter alia, expansion of the Department's pre-complaint civil inves-
tigatory powers, increased parenspatriae authority to state attorneys general, pre-merger notification
procedures and an automatic injunction (with limitations) against consummation of mergers or ac-
quisitions challenged by federal enforcement agencies.
78. Id. This statement was the basis of one of the primary criticisms of the Act offered by the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States by J.W. Riehm and J. Randolph Wilson. The Chamber
believed that existing investigatory powers of the Department were adequate and that a grant of
broader powers would unwisely cause "many of the staff of the Antitrust Division... [to] become
bogged down in investigations of antitrust trivia." Id. at 177. The Chamber of Commerce chastised
the FTC for becoming bogged down with its own broad investigative powers rather than concentrat-
ing on "its primary role of a broad antitrust policymaker." Id.
79. Id. at 92. See also 122 CONG. REC. 15487, 16925-26 (1976) ("[The Justice Department has
in recent years begun to intervene in and appeal from various agency proceedings which do not in its
view pay enough attention to competition.... The Department of Justice is, after all, an enforce-
ment agency. It should remain one.") (Statements of Senators Fannin and Hansen). See also 122
CONG. REC. 16927 (1976) ("We have vested the Antitrust Division ... with the full authority to
look out after competitive forces in our economy .... Here, and by statute, we permit them to
intervene in various regulatory agency cases.") (Statement of Senator Kennedy).
80. S. REP. No. 94-803, Part II, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 167-274 (1976) (minority views of the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate on S. 1284). The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, Pub. L. No. 94-
435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18a and 1311-1314 (1982), was the culmination of
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ity Committee members opposed the use of CID's for proposed merger
violations because they did not perceive the Department as a regulatory
agency subject to the safeguards of the Administrative Procedure Act.81
The minority stated:
The Department of Justice is not a regulatory agency subject to direct
congressional oversight, but is the prosecuting arm of the U.S. Govern-
ment. There is a vast difference between a prosecutor and a regulator.
Conferring the investigatory powers of a regulatory commission on a prose-
cutor is alien to our legal traditions and contrary to the premise of the fifth
amendment, which contemplates that a prosecutor can investigate crime
only through the grand jury process. 82
Allowing CID's, the minority argued, would give the Department "regu-
latory" powers directly opposite to the original mandate for prosecution
of the antitrust laws.83 The minority characterized FTC as an investiga-
tor and factfinder with no authority to determine civil or criminal liabil-
ity and noted that the "rigorous protections relevant to criminal
prosecutions" would, therefore, be unnecessary.84 The minority also
identified the FTC's inability to intervene before all other government
agencies as a justification for allowing it broad investigatory powers, and
denied similar powers to the Department because it can file "comments"
with other regulatory bodies.8 5 The minority supported its position with
the findings of the 1955 Attorney General's Committee Report. Summa-
rizing that committee's view, the minority noted that that committee had
refused to give unlimited administrative power to the Department be-
the legislative efforts to improve antitrust enforcement begun in 1975 with hearings conducted by the
Subcommittee on Antitrust Monopoly.
81. S. REP. No. 94-803, supra note 80, at 196-200. But see 122 CONG. REC. 15973 (1976):
The Judiciary Committee has carefully considered the issue of whether or not safeguards
*.. are sufficient to protect the legitimate interests of the public against unreasonable Gov-
ernment intrusion.... We are confident that the provisions ... strike a balance between
the rights of the persons under investigation and thirdparties against unreasonable Govern-
ment intrusion....
Id. (Statement by Senator Hart). See also safeguards listed at infra, note 91.
82. S. REP. No. 94-803, supra note 80, at 196; 122 CONG. REC. 15317, 15834, 16485 (1976).
But see 122 CONG. REC. 16485 (1976):
The minority report tries to claim that there is a difference between regulatory agencies and
the Justice Department, because the latter is a prosecutor rather than a regulator. In fact,
a number of non-regulatory agencies also possess such authority including the Department
of Agriculture, Labor... The critics of this title clearly stand on thin ice. ...
Id. (Statement by Senator Hathaway).
83. S. REP. No. 94-803, supra note 80, at 198; see also 122 CONG. REC. 17563-64 (1976).
84. S. REP. No. 94-803, supra note 80, at 198.
85. Id.
[Vol. 64:997
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss4/2
Number 4] ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1017
cause it was an enforcement agency.8 6
The minority members of the committee attacked the pre-merger noti-
fication provision because it assumed that mergers are bad per se and
that notification was necessary to correct faulty mergers.8 7 The minority
felt the Department and the FTC had sufficient present powers to stop
anticompetitive mergers. In their view, pre-merger stay provisions
would "indirectly vest in the Department ... an unjustifiable and de-
structive regulatory authority."8 "
Despite the continued, strong warnings concerning the expansive regu-
latory nature of CID's and pre-merger notification, Congress passed,
without conference resolution, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976.89 In
doing so, it increased CID authority and provided for premerger notifica-
tion to the Antitrust Division.90
In answer to the minority's criticisms, the Act contained many proce-
dural safeguards designed to guard against prosecutorial abuse under the
expanded CID authority. 91 The pre-merger notification provision itself
86. Id. at 197. The minority seemed particularly troubled by giving one who might institute a
prosecution (instead of referring the information to someone else) broad investigatory powers with-
out adequately protecting the right of the individual. Id. However, it should be noted that the
minority appeared to base its objections primarily on perceived possible abuse of the fourth amend-
ment protections against unwarranted search and seizure, primarily in criminal contexts.
87. Id. at 205; 122 CONG. REC. 16915, 16928 (1976).
88. S. REP. No. 94-803, supra note 80, at 213. See also 122 CONG. Rac. 16916 (1976) (refer-
ring to a proposed automatic stay provision, Senator McClure stated: "Title V would vest in the
Justice Department and the FTC an unjustifiable and destructive regulatory authority and veto over
the process of capital allocation.")
89. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, Pub. Law No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 18a and 1311-1314 (1982)).
90. Id. (The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976 expanded the existing CID authority to include
investigating a proposed but unconsummated merger or acquisition, servicing demands on natural
persons, issuing demands to persons not themselves targets of antitrust investigations and issuing
demands for written interrogatories and oral testimony).
9l. Id. at § 1311-1314. Safeguards against potential CID abuse include the following: (1) speci-
fication in the CID of the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged violation; (2) confidentiality
of materials contained in the CID, (3) representation by counsel of any person required to give oral
testimony and reservation of legal rights to object to questions, (4) the Department's inability to
compel oral testimony without resort to federal court, (5) the Department's inability to impose pen-
alties for noncompliance with the CID without resort to court, and (6) various grounds of objections
to compliance. In addition, the House Committee on the Judiciary rejected the minority's concerns
that the increased CID power was inappropriate for a prosecutorial body and converted the Depart-
ment into a regulatory body. H.R. REP. No. 94-1343, 15 (July 15, 1976) (To accompany H.R.
13489). The Committee clearly believed that most of the Division's efforts involve civil litigation
and that many federal and state antitrust or other law enforcement agencies and officials possess
similar investigatory powers. Id. at 4, 5, 16, 25.
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also afforded protection by permitting both speedy resolution of the
transaction and adequate review to ensure compliance with the law and
opportunity for effective relief.92
Congress did not explicitly disagree with the roles that the minority
assigned to the FTC and the Department. However, it is not entirely
clear whether Congress simply rejected the proposition that the legisla-
tion actually altered the roles or whether it was merely satisfied that pro-
cedural safeguards within the legislation adequately protected against
possible harms. Arguably, Congress was on notice that this legislation
would alter the historic enforcement role of the Antitrust Division. The
direction was towards that of an economic regulator, especially if one
compares the almost identical pre-merger clearance process approved for
and exercised by both the FTC and the Antitrust Division.9"
II. MODELS OF REGULATION
More than a century has passed since government regulation of indus-
try and private property began in the United States. The Supreme Court
first sanctioned regulatory schemes in Munn v. Illinois,94 and Congress
first sanctioned such schemes with the formation of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission.9" Munn set the legal standard for national regula-
tory intervention in the market:
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner
to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When,
92. 15 U.S.C. § 18a. The pre-merger notification provisions contain the following "protec-
tions" against unwarranted government intrusion into legitimate business transactions: (1) certain
types of transfers and acquisitions are exempt, (2) jurisdictional requirements regarding size of the
parties and amount of voting securities or acquired assets involved exclude nonsignificant or trivial
transactions, (3) confidentiality of the information is provided, (4) only one extension of the waiting
period is permitted to the Department and FTC without a court order, (5) special rules for tender
offers speed consideration of such transactions without needlessly delaying consummation of the
offer, and (6) expedited court consideration must be provided when the government seeks injunctive
relief.
93. Id. at § 18a(a)-18a(g).
94. 94 U.S. 113 (1877). For other cases decided with Munn regulating railroad rates see Stone
v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181 (1877); Winona & St. Peter R.R. v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180 (1877); Chicago,
M. & S.P.R.R. v. Ackley, 94 U.S. 179 (1877); Peik v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877);
Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877). See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp,,
301 U.S. 1 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398 (1934).
95. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.). But see Wabash, St. Louis & P. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886) (state
could not regulate shipping in interstate commerce).
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therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an inter-
est, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in the use, and must submit
to be controlled by the public for the common good.96
The "affected with public interest" standard announced in Munn
stands today as the central principle for government control of economic
activity. It portended broad regulation over business and the establish-
ment of federal regulatory agencies. 97 Although regulation has taken
many forms since the late nineteenth century, several models of regula-
tion can be identified and the purposes underlying the regulations ex-
plored. These regulatory models and their purposes can inform any
discussion of contemporary regulatory practices at the Antitrust
Division.
Economic regulation is evident in either its motivation or effect.98
Changing economic conditions or theories often foster a change in regu-
latory form or response.99 Pervasive government regulation reached a
high point during the New Deal and Great Society programs. Deregula-
tion, which began in the late 1970's,1 ° now has reached its crescendo. In
certain industries, re-regulation is even now on the rise. From these
changes in regulatory climate, we can describe the forms and purposes of
regulation that have evolved. Some commentators have broadly defined
"regulation" to mean government intervention in the market as a means
of assuring good or more competitive performance."' 1 Since the 1877
Munn decision, one regulatory purpose has been to ensure the more effi-
cient functioning of markets. 10 2 Government has intervened in the mar-
ket when self-correction appeared unlikely as a result of high fixed costs,
96. 94 U.S. at 126 (citing De Portibus Maris, 1 Harg. Law Tracts 78 (Lord Chief Justice Hale's
treatise)).
97. The creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the enactment of the Sherman
Act are early examples. For an excellent discussion of this early era of regulation, see Rabin, supra
note 26. See also supra § I; J. WILSON, THE POLITICS or- REGULATION 8 (1970).
98. 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 8 (1970).
99. Rabin, supra note 26, at 1189-90.
100. See, e.g., Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 226 (1982)); Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982)); Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. (6-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (1982)); Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (1982)).
101. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 98, at 20.
102. See generally Rabin, supra note 26, at 1252. It is beyond the scope of this article to access
the costs on industry and benefits to the public of the government largess. See generally 0. WIL-
LIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975); Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J. LAW
ECON. 1 (1960); Landes & Posner, Adjudication As A Private Good, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 235 (1979).
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economics of scales, externalities, structural shortcomings, bargaining in-
equality, market disincentives, monopoly power, windfall profits, inade-
quate information, scarcity in supply, paternalism, income transfers, or
allocative waste.103
Frequently, the purpose of intervention has been to achieve distribu-
tional consequences, requiring income or wealth transfers from one
group in society to another, or for economic rehabilitation or prosperity.
But the purpose or effect of regulation has not always been clear. For
example, the "public interest" notion of regulation promotes public inter-
est over private gain as justification for market intervention."° Substan-
tial challenges to such regulatory purposes began in the 1960's, although
the counter theories have much earlier origins. Political motives for reg-
ulation were studied and found, in certain industries and certain eras, to
dominate over public interest concerns. Regulation was viewed as purely
political when designed to protect and serve the interest of those being
regulated-i.e. special interest legislation designed to obtain more from
government and consumers to the benefit of those regulated. Purely
political regulation is seen by many as a means through which producers
or sellers "capture" the industry for private advantage. While political
motives focus on net gains from the system to those being regulated, the
"capture theory" is concerned with the economic consequences of regu-
lation: as producers promote government regulation and market inter-
vention, increased costs (deadweight loss) are shifted to consumers,
competition is discouraged and, in general, a redistribution of wealth is
effected. Under this theory, regulation is considered anticompetitive.10 5
103. ABA COMMISSION ON LAW & ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM
26-31 (1979). See also S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982); Posner, Natural
Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969); Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regula-
tion, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 3 (1971).
104. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 98, at 3-7: "One view, which convinced the Court majority in Munn
v. Illinois, in 1877, was that regulation might properly be introduced to protect customers from
exploitation of private monopolists." But, others, including Justice Brandeis, have recognized and
argued that other unregulated business activity may be harmful to the public and may require regu-
lation. Kahn illustrates this point with Brandeis' view that "unregulated competition could be exces-
sively strong" and injure both business and the public. Id. at 7.
105. Rabin, supra note 26, at 1252-53, 1295, 1316. See generally A. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECO-
NOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, 161-220 (1980); G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULA-
TIONS: 1877-1916 (1965); P. MACAvoY, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGULATION (1965); T.
MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 302-303 (1984); S. SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERI-
CAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, 125-50
(1982); Wilson, The Politics of Regulation in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 140-41, 446 (J.
Wilson ed. 1980); Dilorenzo, The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective 5 INT'L REV.
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Classical models of regulation include: 1) cost-of-service ratemaking,
2) reallocation in accordance with the "public interest," 3) standard-set-
ting, 4) historically-based price-setting, and 5) historically based-alloca-
tion.106 Another type, de facto regulation, uses other regulatory controls
to preserve competitive markets by imposing 1) taxes as an incentive or
deterrent to conduct, 2) a bargaining process through which the regula-
tory agency bargains with the regulated industry or firm to achieve con-
sensus, 3) disclosure requirements used for economic purposes, and
4) preclearance (screening) approval procedures. 0 7 Several of these reg-
ulatory paradigms form the basis of the present regulatory posture of the
Antitrust Division over mergers and acquisitions. 10 8
One of the most commonly applied classical models of regulation in-
L. ECON. 73 (1985); Harbeson, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916 Conspiracy or Public Interest?,
27 J. ECON. HisT. 230 (1967); Purcell, Ideas and Interests: Businessmen and the ICC, 54 J. AM.
HIST. 568 (1967); Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REv. 713, 723-28
(1986).
106. ABA COMMISSION ON LAW & ECONOMY, supra note 103, at 31; S. Breyer, supra note 103,
at 37-130. See also Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519 (1945).
107. ABA COMMISSION ON LAW & ECONOMY, supra note 103, at 31, 42-49; S. BREYER, supra
note 103, at 156-84. See also G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); T. MCCRAW, supra
note 105, at 301; Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, supra note 102; Demsetz, When Does the Rule
of Liability Matter?, I J. LEG. STUD. 13 (1972).
108. Several of the classical models of regulation are not relevant to the Antitrust Division's
oversight responsibilities on mergers. At least two focus explicitly on price control. For example,
cost of service ratemaking generally applies when an agency regulates prices and profits of firms. It
has occurred for natural monopolies (public utilities) as well as competitive markets (airlines). The
regulator determines the costs and then sets the price or rate structure in order for the firm or
industry to receive a "reasonable rate of return."
Historically based price regulation is an alternative regulatory device used when regulated firms
have disparate costs. The regulator implements price controls that allow each firm to charge the
price it charged on a particular historical date plus an additional percentage per year. Industry-wide
price controls (such as in the oil industry) have been implemented by use of historically based price
regulation.
Allocation in the public interest applies when there are scarce resources. The regulatory agency
chooses a standard under which the scarce resources (television licenses, airline certifications) will be
allocated. The agency decides what and how much will be given away, the threshold objective crite-
na used to judge those qualified, and the duration of the license.
A regulator can also allocate scarce resources on a historic data basis. Historically based alloca-
tion has been used when there are short term scarcities; the oil crisis of 1973 is an example. Alloca-
tions are based on past quantities consumed rather than past prices. As an adjunct to historically
based allocations, price controls or resale restrictions are added in order to prevent those with histor-
ical rights in a commodity from earning windfall profits.
Alternative methods to classical regulation, in which the Antitrust Division would not normally
be involved, include assessing taxes. In addition to raising revenue, taxes can stimulate or discourage
economic behavior and redistribute income (using cost-of-service ratemaking to eliminate windfall
profits). Because taxes do not fix prices, they permit the market to allocate the output through
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volves the setting of standards. The regulator, often an administrative
agency, first determines what adverse effects exist in the market and
whether they should be eliminated or minimized. After determining the
problem, and the costs and benefits of eliminating or minimizing it, the
agency then gathers relevant information necessary to draft a standard.
Standards, of course, must be enforced once promulgated. And, any
agency regulation that imposes rights and obligations must comply with
the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). The APA requires agencies to provide a "concise general state-
ment" of the standard's "basis and purpose."' 10 9
Another form of regulation is disclosure. Disclosure requirements can
be designed to inform or used to achieve economic regulatory purposes.
In either case, the agency must designate the conditions that trigger dis-
closure obligations and provide for enforcement mechanisms. Although
similar to standard setting in many respects, disclosure regulation has a
narrower impact. It does not prohibit or prescribe certain products or
conduct; it only mandates the disclosure of certain information. When
used as a means of economic regulation, disclosure informs regulators of
the industry and specific firm data that are relevant to competitive mar-
ket factors. Disclosure requirements are considered less costly and less
restrictive than standards set to regulate production, output or product
prices. 110
A preclearance screening process, analogous to standard setting, is an-
other form of regulatory control. Under this model agencies have au-
normal price system, thereby avoiding allocation through regulation. See generally ABA COMMIS-
SION ON LAW & ECONOMY, supra note 103, at 37-40; S. BREYER, supra note 103, at 96-119.
109. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). Although the Merger Guidelines, discussed hereafter, were issued
by the Department of Justice and published in the Federal Register, standing alone they are not
regulations per se. Distinctions are drawn between promulgated regulations and general statements
of policy. Statements of policy are those "issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of
the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power." UNITED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL 30 n.3 (1947), cited in Brock v. Cathedral
Bluffs Shale Oil Co., No. 84-1492 (D.C. Cir. July 29, 1986). As the District of Columbia Circuit said
in Brock:
[a]n agency pronouncement is not deemed a binding regulation merely because it may have
"some substanative impact," as long as it "leave[s] the administrator free to exercise his
informed discretion".... Federal Register is an indication that the statement in question
was not meant to be a regulation... [but] [t]he real dividing point between regulations and
general statements of policy is publication in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Id. The Merger Guidelines were not published in the Code of Federal Regulation.
110. ABA COMMISSION ON LAW & ECONOMY, supra note 103, at 44; S. BREYER, supra note
103, at 161-64.
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thority to screen applicants based upon pre-formulated standards that
satisfy regulatory objectives. After applicants petition for approval, the
standards are applied on an ad hoc basis. Applications that do not meet
the preclearance standards are denied or challenged. Preclearance
screening operates much like licensing which allocates resources based
on public interest standards. 1 I
Finally, bargaining is an alternative, or de facto, model of regulation.
Its objectives are the development of a consensus between parties who
share similar interests. The process is one of trade offs-each party must
determine its priorities within certain limits, weigh the costs and benefits
of each, and determine the higher values. Bargaining produces greater
likelihood for voluntary compliance' 12 and imposes fewer costs on the
parties than do other regulatory methods. Successful bargaining mini-
mizes enforcement costs as well, because voluntarily compliance is more
likely when standards are defined by consensus. A number of shortcom-
ings are inherent, however, in the bargaining process. First, bargaining
does not work unless consensus can be achieved. Second, the process is
not useful unless the parties have roughly equivalent bargaining power.
Third, a final agreement may affect parties not represented in the bar-
gaining process.113
The Antitrust Division's merger approval process employs all the reg-
ulatory methods described above, standard setting, disclosure,
preclearance screening and bargaining. Through this regulatory process,
the Department of Justice regulates economic behavior and allocates
scarce resources by applying standards and structuring the merged entity
to avoid competition problems. The application of these regulatory de-
vices is not typical behavior for a law enforcement agency.
As an example, the Department has issued Merger Guidelines, which
set forth a "public interest" standard of competition focusing on market
power and collusive practices." 4 Before the review of any proposed
merger, the Antitrust Division requires, under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act of 1976,' 5 disclosure of certain economic and financial data of both
111. S. BREYER, supra note 103, at 131-55. See also S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW AND THE REGULATORY POLICY (1979).
112. S. BREYER, supra note 103, at 178.
113. Id. at 180-81.
114, Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman's View, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 618, 622
(1983).
115. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 18a
and 1311-1314 (1982)).
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the acquiring and acquired firms. Pursuant to this disclosure, the Divi-
sion can issue a business review letter1 16 setting forth present enforce-
ment intentions regarding the "proposed business conduct." This
premerger review is essentially a preclearance screening process that per-
mits the Division to screen out mergers with reasonable probabilities 17
of anticompetitive consequence. If the proposed merger is not objection-
able, the business review letter can issue stating that the Department
"has no present intention of instituting enforcement proceedings to chal-
lenge" the proposed merger. If the proposed merger raises antitrust con-
cerns, the Division identifies the areas of anticompetitive effect and
bargains or negotiates with the merging parties to restructure the merger.
If the parties fail to reach a consensus on the restructured merger, the
parties can abandon the merger or the Department can file suit to enjoin
the proposed merger. The present administration has used the latter
remedy only infrequently.
In summary, the Antitrust Division engages in regulatory-type con-
duct by: 1) setting standards through its announced Guidelines, 2) re-
viewing data through the required disclosure provisions, 3) screening out
potentially anticompetitive mergers through the preclearance screening
process, 4) negotiating a restructured merger if necessary, and finally,
5) if the bargaining process is successful, issuing an approval, similar to a
"license," through a business review letter.
III. THE ANTITRUST DIVISION AS ECONOMIC REGULATOR
As briefly outlined in the prior section, the present merger approval
process clearly demonstrates that the Antitrust Division has become an
economic regulator of mergers. This transformation, from a litigating
division to a de facto regulatory agency, began in the 1960's. The Divi-
sion's increased focus on economic analysis of mergers and the Division's
adoption of the 1968 Merger Guidelines signaled the first break with the
past.
116. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1985).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982):
No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock [or assets]
or other share capital ... where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting com-
merce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition... may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
[Vol. 64:997
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A. Merger Guidelines
The 1968 Merger Guidelines set forth the standards, enforcement in-
terpretation and policy by which the Antitrust Division would determine
whether to challenge mergers and acquisitions.118 The Guidelines were
not to be considered as a substitute for the Division's business review
process." 9 The Division preferred to use the business review process
when determining the legality of a particular proposed merger.12
Stating that the primary role of section seven of the Clayton Act was
to "preserve and promote market structures conducive to competition,"
the Guidelines attempt to identify those mergers or acquisitions that
were likely to alter the structure of the market in a way that was not
conducive to competitive conduct.' 2 '
Market structure is the focus of the Department's merger policy chiefly
because the conduct of the individual firms in a market tends to be con-
trolled by the structure of that market, i.e., by those market conditions
which are fairly permanent or subject only to slow change (such as, princi-
pally, the number of substantial firms selling in the market, the relative
sizes of their respective market shares, and the substantiality of barriers to
entry of new firms into the market).122
Recognizing that not all proposed mergers might be susceptible to a
structure-conduct analysis, especially where the market was in transition,
the Guidelines pointed out that in exceptional circumstances the Divi-
sion could be guided by "a more complex and inclusive evaluation."'' 23
But in the main, the Guidelines centered on identifying acceptable mar-
ket shares in horizontal mergers, I24 the foreclosure of competition in ver-
118. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES 1968 reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
r 4510 (1982).
119. See infra at § III.C for a discussion of the business review procedure.
120. See supra note 118, at 6882.
121, Id. See generally J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956); Stigler, The Case
Against Big Business, 47 FORTUNE 123 (1952).
122. MERGER GUIDELINES 1968, supra note 118, at 6882.
123. Id.
124. The most prominent feature of the 1968 Guidelines horizontal merger analysis was the use
of the four-firm concentration ratio. The four-firm concentration ratio examined the pre-merger
market shares of the four largest firms in a market. A concentration ratio of 75% indicated a highly
concentrate market; it was subject to a more stringent standard of review. This standard was signifi-
cant because it resulted in a lowering of the market share combinations that would be challenged in a
merger. For instance, in a less highly concentrated market, mergers between firms that had market
shares of 5% and 5%, or 10% and 4%, or 15% and 3% were likely to be challenged. In a more
highly concentrated market, with a concentration ratio above 75%, mergers between firms with
shares of 4% and 4%, or 10% and 2%, or 15% and 1% would be challenged. See MERGER GUIDE-
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tical mergers, and the elimination of potential competitors, the creation
of reciprocal dealing and the entrenchment of a dominant firm in a con-
centrated market.
Despite an attempt to follow the case law, the courts did not adopt the
1968 Guidelines with regularity.125 In the fourteen year period following
the issuance of the 1968 standards, the Division's philosophy changed,
economic analysis was refocused, and decisional law developed without
adherence to the Guidelines.1 26 As a result, a new administration, with
an attitude more favorable to larger mergers and the market forces, is-
sued new Guidelines in 1982.
In contrast to the 1968 Guidelines, the 1982 Guidelines reflected a
major change in merger standards. The "law enforcement" philosophy
that prevailed at the Antitrust Division when the first Guidelines were
issued in 1968 had faded by the time the 1982 Guidelines were issued. 127
Indeed, in announcing the new Guidelines, Attorney General William
French Smith stated that the new Guidelines "outline the general princi-
ples and specific standards the Department's Antitrust Division uses in
screening the hundreds of mergers it examines every year."1 28 He did not
mention, as had been stated in the 1968 Guidelines, the Department's
role as an "enforcement agency." 129 He only noted that the new stan-
dards differed "considerably from the old ones." 130
First, the 1982 Guidelines centered on preventing mergers that facili-
LINES 1968 supra note 118, at 6683-84. Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines and the Herfindahi.
Hirschman Index, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 402, 406-07 (1983). See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294 (1962) (court used concentration ratio).
125. Compare Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 353-54 (2d Cir. 1979); United States Steel
Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 606 (6th Cir. 1970) with Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 504 n.13
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973); Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp.
315, 325 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). See also
F & M Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 597 F.2d 814, 817 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1979); Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co. v. WhiteConsol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 524-25 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1009 (1970).
126. Bauer, Government Enforcement Policy of Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Carte Blanche for
Conglomerate Mergers, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 348 (1983); Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines: Of Collusion, Efficiency and Failure, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 497 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Kauper, The 1982 Guidelines].
127. Kauper, supra note 126, at 498; Harris & Jorde, Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines:
Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 464, 486 (1983).
128. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES 1982, reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep,
(CCH) 4500 (1984) (emphasis added).
129. MERGER GUIDELINES 1968, supra note 118.
130. MERGER GUIDELINES 1982, supra note 128. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962), the Supreme Court established a multifaceted balancing analysis for measuring a
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tated: 1) the exercise of market power-the ability to raise prices above
competitive levels without a drop in quantity demand, 2) monopoliza-
tion, and 3) cartelization.131 The emphasis on market power suggested
that the Department's concern was not solely with the increased concen-
tration that results from a new merger. Instead, the concern was with
the potential collusive effects in the industry. 32 Clearly, the new stan-
dards permitted many mergers that would have been challenged under
the 1968 Guidelines. The 1982 Guidelines demonstrated this favorable
attitude toward mergers by employing a test that concentrated on the
horizontal effect of the merger. The Division was given more discretion
not to challenge a proposed merger because, under the 1982 Guidelines,
the Division would insist on "economic evidence of harm or potential
harm to competition before a merger [would] be challenged." ' The Di-
vision's exercise of judgment seemed broader, given the range of eco-
nomic factors to consider. Its discretion to not intervene in capital
markets seemed apparent.
Although they sometimes harm competition, mergers generally play an im-
portant role in a free enterprise economy. They can penalize ineffective
management and facilitate the efficient flow of investment capital and the
redeployment of existing productive assets. While challenging competi-
tively harmful mergers, the Department seeks to avoid unnecessary inter-
ference with that larger universe of mergers that are either competitively
beneficial or neutral.'
3 4
The 1982 Guidelines largely incorporated this philosophy13 5 through
the introduction of a broader market definition. The new definition re-
duced the likelihood that a particular merger would raise antitrust con-
cerns. 136 By changing from a four-firm concentration ratio to that of the
merger's legality. The Court failed, however, to establish weights for each factor in the balancing
process.
131. MERGER GUIDELINES 1982, supra note 129, at 6881.
132. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964); Baker and Blumenthal, The
1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 311, 316 (1983).
133. MERGER GUIDELINES 1982, supra note 128, at 6681-2. See also Kauper, supra note 126, at
508-09.
134. MERGER GUIDELINES 1982, supra note 128, 4501, at 6881-7. See also Statement by
Charles F. Rule, supra note I (characterizing the enforcement policy of the 1960's and 1970's as
interventionist).
135. See Harris & Jorde, supra note 127.
136. In departing from the four-firm concentration ratio of the 1968 Guidelines, the 1982 Guide-
lines employed the use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is calculated by squar-
ing the market share of all the firms in the market and then summing the squares. The standard then
examines the post-merger HHI number and the change or increase in the HHI caused by the merger.
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Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the Department selected a standard
unchartered in merger law and unapproved by the courts. Many, how-
ever, did not believe that a change in definition would lead to different
results. 137
In addition, the 1982 Guidelines explicitly deemphasized the antitrust
importance of vertical and conglomerate mergers. 13  The new Guide-
lines debunk previous economic theories that feared 1) foreclosure of
competition in vertical mergers, 2) the creation of reciprocal dealing, or
3) the entrenchment of a dominant firm in a concentrated market. Non-
horizontal mergers are a concern under the 1982 standards only if they
fall into one of four categories: 1) vertical or conglomerate mergers that
eliminate potential competition, 2) vertical mergers that increase barriers
to entry by necessitating simultaneous two-level entry, 3) vertical merg-
ers that facilitate collusion, and 4) vertical or conglomerate mergers that
facilitate the evasion of rate regulation by a regulated firm.1 39 These
changes are again recognition that the Department is willing to go be-
yond the established case law and, through its expanded discretion, regu-
late mergers by reinterpreting and rearticulating the competition
standards of section seven.
In sum, the 1982 Guidelines expressed a more specifically directed eco-
nomic policy. The standards were more quantitative in approach and
more mathematically precise. They reduced uncertainty and increased
predictability of enforcement intentions. 1" As several commentators
See 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 128, at % 4503 at 6881-11-12. Unconcentrated markets
are defined by an HHI below 1,000, moderately concentrated markets are defined by an HHI be-
tween 1,000 and 1,800, and highly concentrated markets are defined by an HHI above 1,800. If the
post-merger HHI is below 1,000, the Department is unlikely to challenge the merger. If the post-
merger HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800, the Department is likely to challenge only if the change or
increase is more than 100 points. And if the post-merger HHI is above 1,800, the merger is likely to
be challenged if the increase is less than 50 points. See generally Calkins, supra note 124, at 404-05.
137. Baker & Blumenthal, supra note 132, at 312-13, 324, 327; Calkins, supra note 124, at 428-
29. But see Bauer, supra note 126, at 351. See also Fox, The New Merger Guidelines: Blueprint for
Microeconomic Analysis, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 519 (1982). Clearly, the merger in United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), would not be challenged today even though the government
won its challenge to the merger. In Von's Grocery, the pre-merger HHI was 300 and the post-merger
HHI was about 40 points higher.
138. 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 128, at 4504, at 6881-15.
139. A merger challenge even in these categories is unlikely unless the HHI of the target market
is more than 1,800. If effective collusion is particularly likely, a challenge may be made with an HHI
less then 1,800.
140. To be sure, in 1983 fewer than two percent of the mergers required to file Hart-Scott-
Rodino disclosures were challenged. See Sims & Lande, DOJ Adds Revisionist Dollop to '82 Merger
Guidelines, Legal Times, June 25, 1984, at 15, col. 1. But see United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
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with prior Antitrust Division experience have observed: "the guidelines
[have] in fact become the general working standard in the field."'' With
the Antitrust Division interpreting its own standards, it can focus less on
law enforcement and more on regulation. The 1982 Guidelines consti-
tuted a regulatory standard more pervasive than previous standards, and
more open to broad discretion.142 This emerging regulatory philosophy
is significant in light of the nature and difficulty of private merger litiga-
tion.' 43 Negotiated settlements that restructure the merger are hence-
forth implicitly sanctioned. Consequently, if the Department does not
challenge a proposed merger, it is likely that it will go unchallenged.
Therefore, the Department through enforcement of its Guidelines, main-
tains stronger regulatory control than before.
Finally, in 1984 the Department issued another set of revised Merger
Guidelines.'" Although only two years had elapsed, the Department
believed that clarification and refinement were necessary. Paradoxically,
the revisions have interjected greater uncertainty and decreased predict-
ability into the process. At the same time, the revisions have increased
the interpretative discretion and regulatory nature of the Division.
In four areas, the 1984 standards modify the 1982 Guidelines: 1) mar-
ket definitions, 2) treatment of efficiencies as a defense, 3) the inclusion of
foreign competition into market definitions, and 4) consideration of fail-
ing divisions of healthy firms. 145 To better understand the Division's
broader regulatory control, this Article examines three of these
modifications.
The 1984 Guidelines broaden the test for product and geographic mar-
kets. The Division is no longer retricted to the five percent, price-elastic-
ity test,'46 but now "may at times postulate a price increase that is much
Bak, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (court did not focus on detailed economic evidence as the standard analy-
sis for determining a merger's legality). In Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, the court announced a presump-
tive test of illegality based on market shares.
141. Sims & Lande, supra note 140.
142. See also Kauper, supra note 125, at 508-09.
143. See infra, § IV, note 266.
144. U,S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES 1984, reprinted in 2 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 4490, at 6879-2 (Dec. 12, 1984).
145. Id at 6879-2.
146. Courts had ruled that product markets should be defined according to a product "inter-
changeability" standard or the "cross-elasticity of demand" test. See, e.g., United States v. E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). The 1982 Guidelines refined this standard by
adopting a precise, quantitative test: a market would be recognized for a product and geographic
area where a five percent price increase would not cause buyers of that product to substitute or
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larger or smaller than five percent," 14 7 over a one year period, to deter-
mine what products should be included in the product market definition.
Instead of five percent the standard becomes a "small but significant and
non-transitory"' 148 price increase. This more ambiguous, subjective test
is a return to a broader standard reminiscent of the early case law) 49
The 1984 standards also include foreign competition (and its market
share) in the geographic market definition if a foreign firm is a significant
competitor in the United States domestic market. 150 Given the uncer-
tainty in interpreting the data on currency exchange rates, quotas and
tariffs, the Division exercises broad discretion, on a case-by-case basis,
when deciding whether to include foreign company data in the market
definition. This, in turn, increases the number of negotiable issues be-
tween the Division and the merging parties.
In contrast to the 1968 and 1982 Guidelines and prior case law,'
5
'
which rejected efficiency defenses except in extraordinary cases, the 1984
standards include efficiency considerations among the factors the Divi-
sion examines before challenging a merger. However, the merging par-
ties must support by "clear and convincing" evidence any claim that
would not cause new competitors to enter the product market to compete with the firm that raised
the price. If the data demonstrated that, in response to a five percent price increase of a product, a
new competitor would enter the market, then the product of the outside firm would be included in
the market. MERGER GUIDELINES 1984, supra note 144 4502, at 6881-8.
147. MERGER GUIDELINES 1984, supra note 144, q 4490, at 6879-2.
148. Id.
149. See United States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (first articulation
of the broader standard).
Every manufacturer is the sole producer of the particular commodity it makes but its con-
trol ... of the relevant market depends upon the availability of alternative commodities for
buyers: i.e., whether there is a cross-elasticity of demand .... This interchangeability is
largely gauged by the purchase of competing products for similar uses considering the
price, characteristics and adaptability of the competing commodities.... An element for
consideration as to cross-elasticity of demand between products is the responsiveness of the
sales of one product to price changes of the other. If a slight decrease in the price of
cellophane causes a considerable number of customers of (the] other... to switch .... it
would be an indication that a high cross-elasticity of demand exists between them; that the
products compared in the same market.
Id. at 380-81, 400.
150. MERGER GUIDELINES 1984, supra note 144, t 4490, at 6879-4.
151. See, eg., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
[A] merger the effect of which 'may be substantially to lessen competition' is not saved
because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be
deemed beneficial. A value choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of
judicial competence, and in any event has been made for us already, by Congress.... It
therefore proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the malignant alike, fully
aware, we must assume, that some price might have to be paid.
Id. at 371.
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efficiencies will result. The Division then determines whether this "clear
and convincing" test has been met. This significant change is consistent
with the new standards' overall textual tone and general philosophy that
mergers have the potential to enhance efficiency. The type of efficiency
data subject to analysis is also broader than that suggested under the
1982 Guidelines.
In short, the less precise 1984 Guidelines invite a more open-ended
balancing analysis 52 and leave more room for the exercise of discretion
by the Division. The Guidelines permit the Division greater flexibility
and, thus, control over the screening process. Through the standard-set-
ting process the Guidelines repose the decisionmaking power over
merger approval in the discretion of the Antitrust Division.
B. Premerger Disclosure Requirements
In 1976, Congress passed the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, which prescribes
certain premerger disclosures.1 53 The purpose of the Act is to delay or
prevent the consummation of mergers until the Department or the Fed-
eral Trade Commission has an appropriate opportunity to analyze the
proposed merger. The Act does not change the substantive antitrust law
governing the legality of mergers, but it does require advance notification
and does set forth specific waiting periods before the consummation of
the transaction. Congress designed the waiting period to give the review-
ing agency sufficient time to approve the merger or to proceed expedi-
tiously to seek injunctive relief.15 ' The latter procedure automatically
delays or prevents the consummation of the transaction.
The Act imposes disclosure requirements on parties to "very large
mergers and acquisitions" in which a) either party is engaged in com-
merce, b) the net sales or total assets of one of the parties is $10 million
or more and the net sales or total assets of the other is $100 million or
152. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See also Miller, Notes on the
1984 Merger Guidelines: Clarification of the Policy on a Repeal of the Celler-Kefauver Act? 23 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 653, 658 (1984).
In addition, there is recognition that the formulas used within the Guidelines, such as the HHI
standard, are not brightline tests, and that the Department will consider all relevant factors in ana-
lyzing the merger. For example, the Department will not solely consider the HHI when evaluating
horizontal mergers, but will look to other factors as well, such as whether current market shares are
misleadingly over or understated due to changing market conditions. MERGER GUIDELINES 1984,
supra note 144, 4492, at 6879-12. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486
(1974).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1982) (Section 7A of the Clayton Act).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 18(f) (1982).
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more, and c) the acquiring firm, as a result of the acquisition, holds fif-
teen percent or $15 million of the voting securities or assets of the ac-
quired firm.155 The pervasive disclosure requirements do not depend on
the form of the transaction. 56 For example, ordinary acquisitions of se-
curities or assets, 157 statutory mergers or consolidations 58 and tender
offers159 as well as conversions of convertible securities,160 formations of
joint ventures161 and secondary acquisitions 162 must be reported.
If premerger disclosure is required, the parties must file detailed notifi-
cation and report forms. The required data include type of transaction,
structure of the merging firms, holdings of the acquiring party in the
acquired firm, horizontal overlaps, vertical relationships and any acquisi-
tions made within the previous ten years. 163
The Act empowers the FTC, with the concurrence of the Assistant
Attorney General, to issue rules for the implementation of the Act. Simi-
larly, the regulatory authorities have discretion, as delegated by Con-
gress, to exempt certain classes of persons and transactions from
compliance with the Act or with any aspect of the notification require-
ments. 6' The Antitrust Division independently determines the form of
notification, receives the filings under the Act and extends or terminates
the waiting period.' 6  In addition, the Division may request submission
of any additional information or documents;1 66 such a request extends
the waiting period. Finally, the Division may give the parties to a pro-
155. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)(1)-(a)(3) (1982). There is a $10,000 per day penalty for noncompliance.
15 U.S.C. § 18a(g)(1) (1982).
156. ABA, ANTITRusr LAW DEVELOPMENTS (SECOND) 216 (1984).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2)-(a)(3).
158. 16 C.F.R. § 801.2(d) (1986).
159. Id. at § 801.1(g)(1).
160. Id. at § 801.32.
161. Id. at § 801.40.
162. Id. at § 801.4. The Act and the Rules promulgated under this Act exempt several classes of
transactions and parties from compliance. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c). For example, acquisitions in certain
regulated industries, or acquisitions by institutional investors, underwriters, creditors and insurers,
certain acquisitions of foreign assets or securities, acquisitions made in the ordinary course of busi.
ness or solely for investment by a person who already holds a 50% ownership position are exempt.
16 C.F.R. § 802. In addition, acquisitions valued at less than $15 million in a corporation with less
than $25 million in sales, requisitions representing an amended or renewed tender offer, and acquisi-
tions not meeting or exceeding a greater notification threshold are also exempt. Id. 16 C.F.R.
§ 802.20, .21, .23 (1986).
163. Id. 16 C.F.R. at § 803.1 (1986).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d)(2)(B) (1976).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(2) (1976).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e)(1) (1976); 16 C.F.R. § 803.20(b)(1) (1986).
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posed acquisition a business review letter,167 reflecting the Department's
opinion regarding the legality of the proposed merger. If it finds that the
proposed merger implicates anticompetitive concerns, and the merging
parties do not agree to a restructured merger, the Division can file an
action for injunctive relief in a federal district court.
C. Business Review Letter
For several decades, the Antitrust Division has been willing, in certain
circumstances, to review proposed business conduct and state its enforce-
ment intentions. This practice originated with the "railroad release" pro-
cedure. Under that procedure, the Division would review the proposed
business conduct and state whether it would initiate criminal proceed-
ings, if the proposed conduct was carried out. The Division subsequently
expanded this procedure to include the "merger clearance" procedure
practiced today. Under the merger clearance procedure the Division
states its present enforcement intention and issues a written statement
entitled "Business Review Letter."' 68 The procedure gives the Division
pre-transaction clearance authority to approve or disapprove business
conduct that implicates antitrust concerns.169 Premerger clearance also
avoids the adversarial process and is frequently associated with negotia-
tional posturing.
A party contemplating a merger initiates the business review process
by filing a written request with the Assistant Attorney General.170 The
requesting party must provide the Division with all relevant information
and documents that the Division may need to review the matter.17' The
Division, in its discretion, may refuse to consider the request.' 72 After
examining the business review request, the Division will state its present
enforcement intentions, and then either decline to pass on the request or
take such other position as it considers appropriate. The requesting
167. 16 C.F.R. § 803.30 (1986); 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1985).
168. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1985). The regulations were issued on February 1, 1968, 33 Fed. Reg.
2,422 and have been revised twice, 38 Fed. Reg. 34,804 (December 19, 1973) and 42 Fed. Reg.
11,831 (March 1, 1977). Advisory opinions were first used, twice, during the T. Roosevelt Adminis-
tration. See supra section IC.
169. The concept is not new; the "idea of regulation itself has hinged on the workability of one
or another forms [sic] of advance regulation." T. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 128-30
(1984).
170. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(1) (1986).
171. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(5) (1986).
172. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(2), (7)(a) (1986).
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party will be notified accordingly. 173
At the same time that the Division notifies the requesting party of the
Division's action on the business review request, a press release describ-
ing the action is issued along with a copy of the Division's letter of re-
sponse.17 4 Business review letters state only the enforcement intentions
of the Division as of the date of the letter. The Division remains free to
initiate any action or proceeding it finds consistent with the public
interest. 17
5
D. Negotiation As a Means To Restructure Mergers
The Antitrust Division initiates further investigation, after reviewing
the Hart-Scott-Rodino disclosures, in only a small number of proposed
mergers. 176 The Division does not undertake further investigation when
it believes that a merger will not result in a substantial lessening of com-
petition. 177 If the proposed merger raises competitive concerns, the Divi-
sion has a policy known as "fix it first." This policy rests on a
nonadversarial approach to dispute resolution and employs negotiation
as a means to resolve merger conflicts.
Under the "fix it first" policy, the Division notifies the merging parties
that certain anticompetitive problems are present in the proposed merger
and informs them how these problems might be eliminated. Frequently,
the parties and the Division meet to discuss restructuring the merger to
eliminate the antitrust objection. The Division policy requires that the
problems be removed ("fixed") before the consummation of the merger.
If the problem is eliminated before consummation, the Division will not
file an injunction to prevent the acquisition. However, if time does not
permit restructuring before consummation, the Division may approve
173. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(8) (1986).
174. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(9)(d) (1986).
175. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(9) (1986).
176. For example, the Division conducted expanded investigations as follows:
1978 40
1979 102
1980 56
1981 66
1982 56
1983 62
See Statement by Charles F. Rule, supra note 1.
177. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
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the merger, subject to the entry of a consent decree. The consent decree
will require the resulting company to restructure, according to the terms
of the negotiation, agreement and settlement, within a set period of
time. 178 As a result of the Division's efforts to negotiate a settlement and
to restructure mergers, few public enforcement actions are filed today. 179
The Antitrust Division frequently proposes several types of restruc-
tured mergers. First, and most often, the Division will suggest that the
acquirer divest a unit or units of either firm, which, if retained, would
cause a lessening of competition. Second, the Division may require the
acquiring firm to terminate existing relationships. Third, the Division
may require the two parties to enter into a completely different relation-
ship or to exercise different roles than those originally negotiated by the
parties in their merger agreement. Several recent restructured mergers
are illustrative.
1. Divestiture
In the first category, where the Division requires that assets be sold off,
the Division recently required IBM to divest the mil-spec computer divi-
sion of Rolm as a precondition to approval of the merger between IBM
and Rolm Corp.18 ° A curative consent order contained the parties'
agreement to the Division's suggestions.18'
Similarly, when General Electric announced its proposed merger of
RCA Corporation, the Division first required General Electric to sell its
vidicon tube business. The Division determined, upon review of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino filings, that the merging firms accounted for nearly
ninety-nine percent of all silicon target vidicon tube sales for military
applications in 1985 and ninety percent of all antimony trisulfide target
vidicon tube sales. 82 General Electric was a leading producer of silicon
and antimony trisulfide target vidicon tubes for military applications, and
178. Statement by Charles F. Rule, supra note 1, at 12. In many cases, the divestiture can be
accomplished before the acquisition. See, e-g., United States v. ARA Services, Inc., 1982-3 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 65,209 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
179. Department of Justice Press Release, dated Feb. 15, 1983, regarding the failed acquisition
of National Amusements, Inc. from General Cinema Corp.
180. 48 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 433 (Mar. 7, 1985).
181. United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 48 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 433 (D.D.C. March 7, 1985).
182. TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,086 at 53,768 (June 16, 1986) (consent decree for United v.
General Electric Co.). "Vidicon tubes are image tubes that convert an optical image into an electri-
cal signal." Id. These tubes are used in camera systems.
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RCA was the second largest.1 3 Because the "sell off" agreement could
not be achieved in time, the Division filed a complaint and simultane-
ously filed a consent order setting forth the divestiture agreement of the
parties and the Division.
In another merger, involving Allied Corporation and Signal Compa-
nies, the Division required Allied to divest its air turbine starter by the
end of 1985. Both Allied and Signal were large manufacturers of air
turbine starters. Signal controlled over fifty percent of the market and
Allied controlled a sufficient share to put it in second place. Through the
merger, Allied-Signal would control more than seventy percent of the
(noncommunist) world market in air turbines.'84 Without divestiture,
this merger would have increased the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by
1,975 points, clearly resulting in antitrust problems.
In its settlement with the Division, Allied agreed to sell its air turbine
starter business to a buyer acceptable to the Antitrust Division. 85 In the
event that the sale could not be accomplished by the end of 1985, the
Division would require Allied to sell its entire Bendix Fluid Power divi-
sion, of which the air turbine starter unit was but a part, by March 31,
1986. The Division structured the settlement in this way because it be-
lieved that a forced divestiture of the entire Bendix Fluid Power division
would provide a powerful incentive for Allied to locate an acceptable
buyer. 86 If the sale of the Bendix Fluid Power division became neces-
sary, the Division planned to request a court appointed trustee to oversee
and execute the sale. The Allied-Signal merger demonstrates the creative
but persuasive regulatory oversight exercised by the Division.
One of the most interesting examples of the Antitrust Division's regu-
latory involvement focused on an entire industry-the beer industry. It
was the first time under the Reagan Administration that a proposed
merger was challenged. 18 7 The Justice Department originally became in-
volved in mergers in the beer industry in 1981 when Heileman brewing
attempted to buy Schlitz. As a result of the Justice Department's chal-
lenge, the deal fell through.' 88 Six months later, Stroh's made a deal to
183. Id. Annual sales were approximately $7 million.
184. 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 321 (1985) (consent decree for United States v.
Allied Corp.).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. At the time Heileman was the sixth largest brewer with a 7.5% market share, while Schlitz
was fourth with an 8.5% share. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1036:A-1 (1982).
188. 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 769 (1982).
[Vol. 64:997
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss4/2
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
purchase Schlitz. s9 The Department announced that it would not ask
for additional information, but would continue to investigate. The De-
partment's primary concern was the effect of the merger in the southeast-
ern United States where the merger would have increased the HHI by
150 points.19
Rather than deciding whether to challenge or approve the merger, the
Department began negotiating with the parties to produce a solution that
would allow the transaction to go through while avoiding any section
seven problems. A week following its first announcement, the Depart-
ment announced a proposed consent decree that approved the merger on
the condition that Stroh's would divest a Schlitz plant in the South-
east. 19 1 The plant in question could be sold to anyone but Anheuser-
Busch or Miller,192 the two largest brewers in the country. Eight months
later, the consent decree was modified to allow Stroh's to trade its Schlitz
brewery in Tampa for a Pabst brewery in Minnesota. 193 Therefore, the
restructured entity avoided anticompetitive problems in the Southeast
where Schlitz and Stroh's both had significant market shares. The Divi-
sion's involvement in shaping these mergers provides a clear example of
its willingness to go beyond mere enforcement to facilitate the successful
completion of mergers.
A further example also comes from the brewing industry. In 1982
Heileman entered an agreement to purchase Pabst.' The Division an-
nounced its intention to challenge the merger because it would result in
an HHI increase of 112 points.195 Six weeks later, the Division chal-
lenged an attempt by Heileman to have a third party, nonbrewer, pur-
chaser Pabst and then sell Pabst to Heileman.' 96 Following this
189. Id.
190. Id. In the Southeast, Schlitz had a market share of 13.4%, and Stroh's had a market share
of 6.9%. See also MERGER GUIDELINES 1982, supra note 128, at 4503, at 6881-12 (§ III.A gen-
erl standards (b) Justice Department will challenge merger if HHI increased by 100 or more.).
191. 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 810 (1982) (consent decree for United States v.
Stroh Brewery Co.).
192. Id.
193. 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1224 (1982).
194. 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1264 (1982). Heileman previously had tried to
purchase Schlitz and the Justice Department had not allowed them to intervene in the suit involving
Stroh's and Schlitz.
195. Id. Heileman was the nation's fourth largest brewer with 7.6% market share and Pabst was
the fifth largest with a 7.4% market share. Due to the concentration in the brewing industry, any
merger that increased the HHI by more than 100 was likely to be challenged.
196, 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 271 (1982).
Number 4] 1037
Washington University Open Scholarship
1038 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 64:997
challenge, Heileman began negotiating with the Division to arrive at an
acceptable merger agreement. This negotiation resulted, four months
later, in the Division securing a proposed consent decree. The decree
allowed Heileman to purchase Pabst under the condition that Heileman
would sell eighty-five percent of Pabst's assets. 97
Finally, in a controversial merger between LTV and Republic Steel
Corporation, the Antitrust Division required LTV to divest, within six
months, two of Republic's mills. The Division had determined that the
merger implicated competitive concerns in three product markets: hot-
rolled carbon and alloy sheet and strip; cold-rolled carbon and alloy
sheet and strip; and cold-rolled stainless sheet and strip.'9 The Division
required the divestiture of the Gradsden mill, resulting in a reduction by
one-third of increased concentration in the carbon and alloy sheet mar-
ket. The required divestiture of the Massillon mill eliminated the pro-
jected concentration in the stainless steel and strip market.199 In
addition, the Division prohibited LTV from exchanging any data on the
output or efficiency of any of its mills with any other competitor or the
industry trade association. This precondition seemed unique to the LTV
merger. Further, the Division enjoined LTV and Republic from acquir-
ing assets or securities from any "substantial competitor for ten years. 2 °
197. Id. at 9.
198. 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 577-78 (1984).
199. Id. If the original merger were consummated, LTV and Republic "would have had almost
50 percent of the [domestic] sheet steel market even if you include imports from every single country
of the world, including Japan and the [European Community]." Id.
On July 17, 1986, LTV filed for bankruptcy. It was reported to be the largest bankruptcy filed in
history. LTV was more than $4.2 billion in debt and had more than 20,000 creditors. N.Y. Times,
July 18, 1986, at 21, col. 3.
200. 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 578 (1984).
The preclearance oversight, as dictated by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and exercised by the Anti-
trust Division, is substantially similar to, if not indistinguishable from, that of the Federal Trade
Commission, which is a de jure regulating agency. Yet no one doubts that the Federal Trade Com-
mission is a regulator. An example illustrates the point.
When Standard Oil of California announced its $13.2 billion acquisition of Gulf Corp., the Fed-
eral Trade Commission required as a precondition that certain Gulf properties be divested. The
divested assets included: 1) the Gulf brand name and trademark in six states, consisting of 4,000
gasoline stations and 30 wholesale terminals; 2) the Colonial pipeline; and 3) several refineries. 46
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 871-72 (1984) (consent decree for In re Standard Oil Co.).
In addition, the Federal Trade Commission exercised control over the acquisition. The FrC:
1) issued "hold separate orders" so that Gulf's property could not be controlled until the divestitures
were complete; 2) retained full authority over all divestitures, including authority to order additional
divestitures; and 3) ordered Standard Oil to supply buyers with supplies in order to facilitate refinery
and market efficiencies. Id. at 872.
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2. Relationship Termination
In the second category of cases, the Division has required merging
entities to terminate relationships if they would create problems for com-
petition. Thus, when Signal acquired Wheelabrator-Frye, it had to ter-
minate its relationship with foreign firms for which both Signal and
Wheelabrator-Frye were United States representatives. In addition, the
Antitrust Division required Wheelabrator-Frye to sell its right to two
crude oil processing patents and know-how.201 The Division did not in-
corporate this termination requirement in a consent decree but, exercis-
ing its preclearance discretion, negotiated the termination as part of its
"fix it first" policy. In addition, the Division, insisted that Wheelabrator-
Frye engage in a bidding process for the sale of crude oil processing pat-
ents to ensure that the firm who ultimately acquired the patents was "the
most vigorous and aggressive in the field."202 The Division's oversight
approval of this merger displayed an exercise of sweeping regulatory di-
rection and control.
3. Regulatory "Matchmaker"
In a third type of restructuring, the Division has required the forma-
tion of certain corporate relationships not previously contemplated by
the merging parties. When Alcan Aluminum Limited of Canada sought
to acquire most of the aluminum producing assets of Atlantic Richfield
Company (ARCO), ARCO wanted to exit the industry. Yet, the Depart-
ment, in a consent order,2"3 required ARCO to enter into a production
joint venture with Alcan in which ARCO would hold sixty percent of the
shares and Alcan would hold forty percent. The Department fashioned a
meticulously detailed agreement between the two companies, which re-
quired that the joint venture last for ten years, during which no major
aluminum producer could acquire the ARCO interest. The Department,
in effect, prevented ARCO from leaving the industry and forced it to
enter into a corporate marriage.
After the Division conducted its investigation, it announced that it
would oppose the merger. The parties then requested Division officials
201. 44 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 492 (March 3, 1983); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press
Release (March 1, 1983).
202. 44 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 492 (1983).
203. TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 671 at 5 (Oct. 8, 1984). The four largest firms in the market
account for 87.9% of sales. The merger created a HHI rating of 2,300, thus indicating a "highly
concentrated" market. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release (Oct. 5, 1984).
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to "discuss proposals for restructuring the merger." 2" The Department
proudly proclaimed that ". . . the use of a production joint venture as a
means of settling a §7 case is . . . an innovation,"20 5 but cautioned that
this innovative production joint venture should not be considered a pre-
cedent for future cases, "particularly where the challenged acquisition is
of an existing rather than prospective competitor. 20 6
E. Consent Decrees
The Antitrust Procedure and Penalties Act of 1974 ("Tunney
204. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, supra note 201, at 3.
205. TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 671 at 5 (Oct. 8, 1984).
The Spectra-Physics and Leserplane merger involved similar creative measures. In June 1981, the
Division announced, pursuant to a consent decree, that the newly-formed company was required to
grant nonexclusive, royalty-free licenses for any patent the merging companies had a right to license
as of January 1, 1980. The Division explained that the traditional divestiture option would not be
effective because this industry was more technology-intensive than capital-intensive. Antitrust
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1018 at A-21 (1981).
206. 671 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 6 (Oct. 8, 1984).
The Antitrust Division's regulatory influence also is evident in the application of the "failing
company" doctrine to mergers, see generally Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131
(1969). In Citizen Publishing, the Supreme Court approved a defense to a charge of illegal merger
based upon evidence that the acquired firm was failing, or almost certain to go into bankruptcy with
no chance of successful reorganization, and that a no less anticompetitive merger was possible. The
1984 Merger Guidelines incorporated the "failing company" defense and expanded it to include a
"failing division defense." Both defenses permit the acquisition of an unprofitable division of an-
other firm provided the division is on the verge of liquidation.
A recent example of the failing division defense occurred when Westinghouse proposed the sale of
its failing light bulb division to North American Phillips. 44 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
498 (1983). At the time of the proposed acquisition, Westinghouse had the third highest market
share, 16% of the industry. The two largest firms in the industry had a combined market share of
59%. Even in this highly concentrated market, the Division did not challenge the merger because
Westinghouse could not find a less anticompetitive buyer. Id.
Another example of the application of the "failing company" defense was the recent acquisition by
John Deere & Co. of Versatile Corporation's agricultural equipment operations. The Antitrust Divi-
sion notified the companies that it would not block the acquisition if a "comprehensive search for a
less anticompetitive purchase than Deere" was undertaken, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, 1-3,
(June 20, 1986). At the time of the acquisition, Versatile ranked number one in the four-wheel-drive
tractor manufacturer market with 33% of tractor sales and John Deere ranked number two with a
market share of 26%. I1d.
A final example includes the acquisition of Frontier Airlines by United Airlines. The Justice
Department informed the Department of Transportation that the proposed $146 million transaction
should be allowed to proceed because Frontier was a "failing airline" and a "less anti-competitive
purchaser" was not available. In its communication to the Department of Transportation, the Anti-
trust Division said that if United were prevented from acquiring Frontier, its owner, People Express,
would "begin to immediately liquidate Frontier." U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release (July 28,
1986); Wall St. J., July 29, 1986, at 7, col. 2.
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Act"),2" 7 gives the Antitrust Division authority to negotiate and enter
into consent decrees, making available effective relief from civil antitrust
violations without a trial. The Antitrust Division must submit any con-
sent judgment proposal in a civil proceeding to the district court where
the proceeding is pending and must be publish the proposal in the Fed-
eral Register at least sixty days prior to the effective date of the judg-
ment. Generally, defendants initiate the settlement negotiations for a
consent decree. Frequently, the Division files a proposed consent decree
at the same time it files a complaint.208 This procedure permits the con-
sent decree to incorporate prior negotiations between the Division and
the parties. In addition, the procedure is consistent with the "fix it first"
policy under which the Division advises the merging parties of methods
to avoid the antitrust concerns raised by the proposed acquisition. Fre-
quently, the negotiations concerning the restructuring of the transaction
result in an agreement to file a consent decree, which settles the antitrust
issues and permits the merger to proceed with modifications in the near
future. The entered consent decree can be enforced through subsequent
contempt proceedings.
If the Division and the parties can reach a settlement on the language
of the consent decree, it will be filed with the district court. In addition
to the settlement agreement, the Division must file a competitive impact
statement reciting: 1) the nature and purpose of the proceeding, 2) the
events giving rise to the alleged initiation of the antitrust law, 3) an ex-
planation of the proposal for a consent judgment, 4) the remedies avail-
able to the potential private plaintiffs damaged by the alleged violation,
5) a description of the procedures available for modification of such pro-
posal, and 6) a description and evaluation of alternatives to such propo-
sal actually considered by the Antitrust Division. 2 9 Before entering any
207. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1982). During the debate on the Act, Congress was concerned with the
almost exclusive control that the Antitrust Division exercises over the consent decree process. See
H.R. REP. No. 1463, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
6535; 119 CONG. REC. 3455 (1973).
208. Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1982), and Section 15 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 25 (1982), give federal district courts subject matter jurisdiction to enter injunctions "to
prevent and restrain violations."
209. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)(l)-(b)(6) (1982). A summary of the proposed consent judgment must be
published 60 days prior to the effective date of the judgment in newspapers within the district in
which the case is filed. The proposed judgment and competitive impact statement must be published
in the Federal Register at least 60 days prior to the effective date of the judgment. Public comments
and the Division's reply to them must be published within the 60 day period. 15 U.S.C. § 16(c),
16(d) (1982).
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consent judgment proposed by the Antitrust Division, the court must
make a determination that the entry of such judgment is in the "public
interest."21 0 In this capacity the court is to exercise "an independent
check upon the terms of decrees negotiated"2 1 by the Department. This
standard of review is based on the interests and purposes underlying the
antitrust laws.212
F. Competition Advocacy Program
One of the primary functions of the Antitrust Division is to intervene
or participate before administrative agencies that function wholly or
partly under regulatory statutes in administrative proceedings. 21 3 The
Antitrust Division examines mergers in regulated industries as they
would any other industry in order to determine whether the merger is
likely to have anticompetitive effects. It considers whether substantial
competition between the merging parties will be lessened, and it informs
the regulatory agency of its decision.
The Division, through its competition advocacy program, has been ex-
tremely active in the airline industry and in transportation regulation.
The Division has conducted a number of investigations of airline mergers
and at present is investigating three mergers-Northwest/Republic,
Texas/Eastern and TWA/Ozark.21 4 In March 1986 the Division urged
the Department of Transportation to block Northwest's bid to acquire
Republic because competition in the airline industry would be under-
mined, particularly in the Minneapolis market.21 5 It objected, in addi-
tion, to the TWA acquisition of Ozark because of the resulting
210. 15 U.S.C. § 16(d)-(e) (1982). See generally United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 147-
153 (D.D.C. 1982); United States v. NBC, 449 F. Supp. 1127 (C.D. Cal. 1978); United States v.
Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1975).
211. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 149, aff'd, Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S.
1001 (1983).
212. Id.
213. 28 C.F.R. § 0.40(b) (1985). Such agencies include the Department of Transportation, In-
terstate Commerce Commission, Federal Administration's Commission, Federal Maritime Commis-
sion, Federal Reserve Board, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Federal Trade Commission,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
214. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1986-04 Release, Statement of Charles F. Rule, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial
Law Committee on the Judiciary, House of Rep. (May 1, 1986). See 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 600 (1986).
215. 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 600 (1986).
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concentrated market in St. Louis.216 The Division also recommended
that the Department of Transportation reject Texas Air and Eastern's
application for quick approval of the merger. The Division suggested
instead that "some type of evidence-gathering process" to determine the
potential effects in airline competition be conducted.2 17 However, Texas
Air Corporation's argument to sell certain slots and gates to Pan Ameri-
can World Airways resolved the Division's concern.218 But, the Division
urged the Department of Transportation to approve People Express' ap-
plication to acquire Frontier Airlines because the transaction would have
no anticompetitive effect.219
Within the rail transportation industry, the Division endorsed a re-
vised plan by Norfolk Southern Corporation after initially expressing res-
ervations. That plan assures rail competition in connection with Norfolk
Southern's $1.2 billion bid to acquire Conrail.2 2 0 Appearing before the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the Division urged extension of rail
deregulation, and it advised the Interstate Commerce Commission to al-
low rates to be set by mutual negotiations between railroads and box car
owners.
2 2 1
Although the competitive problems raised in the regulated sectors of
the economy are diverse and varied, the Division's increased advocacy
role remains an adjunct to the primary regulator. Here, too, the Anti-
trust Division is an active participant in the regulatory process. When-
ever possible, the present Division promotes reliance on competition
rather than on government regulation.222
IV. TOWARD MORE EFFICIENT RESOLUTION
OF MERGER CONFLICTS
The preceding sections have demonstrated that the Antitrust Division
216. N.Y. Times, August 8, 1986, col. 6 atD3. A merger of TWA and Ozark would give TWA
control over 76% of the air traffic in St. Louis.
217. 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 540 (1986).
218. 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 867 (1986).
219. 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 843 (1985). Subsequently, the Division approved
United Airlines' acquisition of Frontier for fear that Frontier was a "failing company" and would be
forced to exit the market. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 214; Wall St. J., July 29, 1986, at 7, col.
2.
220. 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 929 (1985).
221. 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 252 (1986).
222. See Oversight Hearings before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1981) (statement of Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter).
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has become, at least in a de facto sense, an economic regulator of merg-
ers. Not all agree that, as a matter of policy, this enforcement direction
is a positive one.223 Few have considered in any depth or in a systematic
way the competing policies involved. Quite clearly, however, as a de-
scriptive matter, we can agree that a major transition from the tradi-
tional, enforcement-oriented agency to that of regulator has occurred.
That such a change has reached its high point during the Reagan Admin-
istration is not doubted. The administration's outspoken policy is to en-
gage in dispute resolution without litigation.22 4 When this trend evolved
is hard to discern, although reasons for the policy shift are evident.
The Antitrust Division's role as economic regulator paralleled the de-
velopment of the Economic Policy Office of the Antitrust Division and
the use of economic analysis by the Division. In 1973, then Assistant
Attorney General Thomas Kauper established the Economic Policy Of-
fice as an outgrowth of the earlier Economic Section of the Antitrust
Division.225 The evidence suggests, however, that the trend towards eco-
nomic analysis and regulation of mergers began by the mid-1960s,
although through the 1960's the Antitrust Division "viewed itself as a
litigating agency. '226 Kauper recently conceded that "by the mid-1960's,
economic analysis... was a primary factor in the formulation of Divi-
sion policy. '227 Indeed, the Division issued the first Merger Guidelines
in 1968.228 The Guidelines represented the first, formal policy shift in
establishing standards through which the Antitrust Division reinter-
preted its enforcement prerogatives and regulated mergers. Throughout
the 1970's, the Division introduced and considered efficiency defenses to
antitrust charges. Congress passed the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in 1976,
which gave the Division greater supervision of mergers through disclo-
223. See, e.g., Bronsteen, A Review of the Revised Merger Guidelines, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 613
(1984); Kauper, The 1983 Guidelines, supra note 126, at 508; Kauper, The Role of Economic Analysis
In The Antitrust Division Before and After The Establishment of the Economic Policy Office: A Law-
yer's View, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 111, 132 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Kauper, Economic Analysis];
Loevinger, Antitrust and the Banking Revolution, REGULATION 19-24 (July 1985).
224. 47 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 986 (1984).
225. White, Introduction to the Morning Session, 29 ANTITRUST BULL 1 (1984); Kauper, Eco-
nomic Analysis, supra note 223, at I 11.
226. Kauper, Economic Analysis, supra note 223, at 116.
227. Id. at 116-17.
228. MERGER GUIDELINES 1968, supra note 118. The Antitrust Division also has issued other
guidelines and standards on topics other than mergers; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE
CONCERNING JOINT RESEARCH VENTURES (1980); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE
FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977).
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sure requirements. In 1982229 and 1984,230 the Division reformulated the
Merger Guidelines. This resulted in merger standards that made chal-
lenges to proposed mergers more difficult than the Supreme Court cases
suggested.231
The operational standards established by the Guidelines were intended
first to restate "developments in antitrust law and economics, and sec-
ond, to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the evaluation of mergers and
acquisitions by the Department. ' 232  In practice, the Guidelines serve,
together with the disclosure requirements, as preclearance screening de-
vices. The Division either: 1) gives a quasi-license to the proposed
merger through interpretation of the standards and negotiation with the
parties, or 2) discourages the merger with the result that the proposal
fades away without a contest on the merits. Unquestionably, the Guide-
lines do contain economic policies of the government. The underlying
assumptions and distributional effects of those economic policies are not
addressed here, but we do inquire into what justifies this dramatic shift
from law enforcement agency to economic planner and regulator.233
229. MERGER GUIDELINES 1982, supra note 128.
230. MERGER GUIDELINES 1984, supra note 144.
231. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Conti-
nental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Rome Cable), 377
U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
232. Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman's View, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 618 (1983).
233. Although the validity of the substantive content of the Guidelines has been challenged, and
their substance undoubtedly affects the outcome of proposed mergers, these issues are beyond the
scope of this Article. Only an analysis of the alternative methods or processes for resolving merger
disputes are addressed here. On the issue of substantive criticism, see, e.g., Bauer, Government En-
forcement Policy of Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Carte Blanche For Conglomerate Mergers, 71 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 348 (1983); Cann, The New Merger Guidelines-Is The Department of Justice Enforcing
the Law? 21 AM. Bus. L.J. 1-48 (1983); Cohen & Sullivan, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the
New Antitrust Merger Guidelines: Concentrating on Concentration, 62 TEx. L. REV. 453 (1983);
Harris & Jorde, Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines: Implications for Antitrust Enforcement,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 464 (1983); Johnstone & Schaerr, Retooling the Merger Guidelines, 69 A.B.A. J.
584-89 (1983); Joseph & Mountz, The Justice Department Merger Guidelines: Impact on Horizontal
Mergers Between Commercial Banks, 72 KY, L.J. 505 (1983-84); Roberts, Barringer & Eaker, The
1982 Merger Guidelines: If "Too Lenient" Why No Old Style Schlitz or Blue Ribbon? 22 Am. Bus.
L J. 503 (1985); Schwartz, The New Merger Guidelines: Guide To Governmental Discretion and
Private Counseling or Propaganda For Revision of the Antitrust Law? 71 CALIF. L. REV. 575 (1983);
Sullivan, The New Merger Guidelines: An Afterword, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 632 (1983); Werden, Mar-
ket Delineation and the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, 1983 DUKE L.J. 514-79; see gener-
ally A Symposium on the 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 613-
717 (1984); Merger Law Update, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 319-57 (1984); The New Merger Guidelines, 51
ANTITRUST L.J. 283-335 (1982); Symposium: 1982 Merger Guidelines, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 280-672
(1983).
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This "process" question is addressed next.
As a general matter the enormous cost associated with litigating poten-
tially anticompetitive mergers is a dominant concern of antitrust litiga-
tion today. Finding means to reduce the costs of resolving merger
disputes serves the public interest.234 Cost reductions can benefit the pub-
lic by conserving the limited resources of the courts, the Antitrust Divi-
sion, and the merging parties. The containment of litigation costs must
be a high priority,2 35 particularly in times of budget restrictions, when
public enforcement agencies must allocate scarce resources efficiently.236
The Supreme Court has recognized efficiency in antitrust litigation as an
important policy goal, and one that will be enforced.237 Therefore, the
central question is whether the present preclearance procedure in resolv-
234. There is a rich literature on the economic concern for finding alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms. See generally R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES (1981); S. GOLDBERG, E.
GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985); Abel, The Contradictions in Informal Justice,
in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 310 (R. Abel ed. 1982); Brazil, Civil Discovery: How Bad
Are the Problems? 67 A.B.A. J. 450 (1981); Burger, Isn't There a Better Way, 68 A.B.A. J. 274
(1982); Cooter, Marks & Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); Janofsky, A.B.A. Attacks Delay and the High Cost of Litigation, 65 A.B.A.
J. 1323 (1979); Kastenmeier & Remington, Court Reform and Access to Justice: A Legislative Per-
spective, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 301 (1979); Landis, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. &
ECON. 61 (1971); LEVIN & COLLIERS, Containing The Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219
(1985); Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 N.W.U. L. REV. 767 (1977); Posner, An
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973);
Rosenberg, Civil Justice Research and Civil Justice Reform, 15 LAW & SOC. REV. 473 (1980-81);
Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976); Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A
TheoreticalAnalysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
55 (1982); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer, & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31
UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983) [hereinafter cited as The Costs of Ordinary Litigation]; Weller, Ruhnka &
Martin, American Experiments for Reducing Civil Trial Costs and Delay, I CIV. JUST. Q. 151 (1982).
235. For example, from 1973 to 1983, the portion of gross national product (GNP) attributable
to legal services increased 59%. Levin & Colliers, supra note 234, at 222-25. Moreover, federal
litigation imposes greater costs than state court litigation. Kritzer, Grossman, McNichol, Trubek &
Sarat, Courts and Litigation Investment: Why Do Lawyers Spend More Time on Federal Cases? 9
JUST. Sys. J. 7 (1984). In addition, from 1960 to 1980 federal district courts filings, measured on a
per capita basis, doubled. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 4 (1983); see also J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981).
236. Efficiency in this context means maximizing certain legal and policy objectives, while mini-
mizing costs, subject to certain constraints. A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS 117 (1983).
237. See, eg., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986); Asso-
ciated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983); Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); see also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc,, 429
U.S. 477 (1977); Hawaii v. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 106 S. Ct.
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ing merger issues is more efficient than traditional litigation. If so, con-
tinuing the Antitrust Division's present posture towards merger
regulation serves the public interest.238 To answer these concerns, we
need to inquire: 1) whether the alternative means of resolving merger
disputes used by the Antitrust Division increase or reduce the costs of
enforcing section seven of the Clayton Act, and 2) whether these proce-
dures reduce or enhance enforcement effectiveness. 239 In short, we ask
whether the benefits of the present regulatory posture exceed the costs of
litigation.
It is well known that the costs of litigation create incentives for the
parties and the government to avoid litigation.2" The high cost of litiga-
tion has increased the importance of alternative means of dispute resolu-
tion.241 Increasingly, conflicts are resolved through alternative means
that achieve settlement before full trial. Antitrust litigation is no excep-
tion to this trend.
A recent study on private antitrust litigation showed that the parties
reached settlement before trial in eighty-eight percent of the filed anti-
trust cases surveyed. In many other antitrust cases, the parties settled
before ever commencing suit. The parties' knowledge that litigation is
not costless and that outcomes are not perfectly predictable spurred a
resolution of their conflict.24 2 For most disputes, the efficient resolution
is not the litigated one. Tradeoffs result which require the parties and the
government policymaker to seek an optimal level of enforcement--one
2548 (1986), rev'g. Cartrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork
J. dissenting).
238. A discussion of whether the present Mergers Guidelines accurately state the substantive law
or take into account questions of distributive justice is beyond the scope of this Article. See supra
note 233. Rather, the focus here is to explore the alternative methods or processes for merger dis-
pute resolution.
239. See generally Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and Regulation of Advertising,
90 HARV. L. REV. 661-701 (1977); SULLIVAN & MARKS, The FTC's Deceptive Advertising Policy: A
Legal & Economic Analysis, 64 OR. L. REV. 593, 614 (1986).
240. Salop & White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001 (1986).
241. See generally J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983); S. MERMIN, LAW AND THE
LEGAL SYSTEM (1982); H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978); Perritt, "And the Whole Earth
Was of One Language"-A Broad View of Dispute Resolution, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1221 (1984);
Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allo-
cation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982); Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive
to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982).
242. Salop & White, supra note 240; see also The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, supra note 234, at
89.
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which minimizes costs while maximizing enforcement objectives. 243
Even if one assumes that the government's enforcement budget was
fixed in real terms, an increase in litigation costs decreases the number of
cases that can be brought for adjudication. 2 " Consequently, the
probability of enforcement decreases and, accordingly, the probability of
undetected section seven violations increases. The same holds true if the
enforcement budget is decreased.
Recognizing the incentives that litigations costs create, the govern-
ment policymaker, in search of the optimal level of enforcement, must
include the costs and benefits of various alternative means of resolving
antitrust disputes. Parties incur costs both in the preparation for adjudi-
cation and the adjudication itself. The decision to litigate includes an
analysis of: 1) the probability of detention and conviction, 2) risk prefer-
ence, 3) severity and magnitude of judgment, 4) trial versus settlement
costs, 5) availability and productivity of each party's resources, and
6) the uncertainty of outcome.245 Tradeoffs, in most cases, lead parties to
243. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND EcONOM-
ics, 10, 13 (1976) ("The appropriate amount of resources devoted to antitrust activities is... deter-
mined by the intersection of the marginal social benefit and the marginal social cost curves.").
Marginal
Social Marginal
Costs Social
and Benefits Marginal
Benefits Social Costs
E Optimal amount of enforcement
Degree of
Competition
If enforcement is to the left of E, more enforcement resources are needed. If to the right of E,
enforcement resources should be reduced.
244. Sullivan and Marks, supra note 239, at 626.
245. Id at 627-28 and accompanying footnotes. See generally Becker, Crime and Punishment:
An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Breit and Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and
Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for Treble Damage, 17 J.L. & EcON. 329 (1974); Calfee and
Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965
(1984); Landes, Optimal SanctionsforAntitrust Violations, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 622 (1983); Mennell, A
Note on Private Versus Social Incentives to Site In a Costly Legal System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD, 41
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utilize some form of alternative dispute resolution such as negotiated set-
tlement. 46 When this does not occur, it is because the minimum settle-
ment demand of the government (plaintiff) exceeds the maximum
settlement demand of the defendant. Efficient case management and res-
olution of these factors, however, has led the Antitrust Division as a mat-
ter of policy to utilize alternative means for the resolution of merger
disputes.247 The fact that the Antitrust Division has avoided the adver-
sarial process is not necessarily bad, especially if viewed in light of the
many advantages of its merger resolution process.248
Although alternative dispute resolution procedures (in contrast to
court adjudication) are currently fashionable,249 they are not new, having
existed as long as civilization.250 Alternative dispute resolution takes
many forms but essentially includes the use of extra-judicial processes,
such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration and settlement.251 In select-
ing the most effective method of resolution, one needs to consider the
general enforcement goals of certainty and clarity of the law, deterrence,
resource allocation, case management, justice and legitimacy.25 2 These
goals, of course, are illustrative rather than exhaustive and not of equal
importance. Moreover, these goals may not be pursued simultaneously
or with equal vigor in each case. Optimally, public officials should pur-
sue those methods of dispute resolution that combine those goals that
(1983); Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement 13 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1970); Posner, An
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973);
Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1075 (1980); The
Costs of Ordinary Litigation, supra note 234.
246. Menkel-Meadow, For & Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement
Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 513 (1985).
247. See section III, supra. See also Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, supra
note 245, at 374-75.
248. The selection of a particular dispute resolution process may be outcome-determinative.
Similarly, a determination of the desired outcome may preordain the use of a particular process.
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 246, at 490.
249. Perritt, supra note 241, at 1225.
250. J. AUERBACH, supra note 241.
251. Fuller, supra note 241; Perritt, supra note 241, at 1230.
252. See, e.g., H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 750 (1958); K. ELZINGA & W.
BREIT, supra note 243, at 11,140-47; Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil
Justice, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 893; Calfee and Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984); Gifford, Communication of Legal Standards,
Policy Development, and Effective Conduct Regulation, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 409 (1971); Hirsch,
Reducing Law's Uncertainty and Complexity, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1233 (1974).
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yield society the greatest utility.253
The resolution methods adopted by the Antitrust Division achieve
many of these enforcement goals. They also satisfy the underlying poli-
cies favoring alternative dispute resolution. Economic efficiency, as it
relates to case management and resource allocation, ranks first. The An-
titrust Division's procedures for reacting to a proposed merger-stan-
dard setting (Guidelines), disclosure requirements, preclearance
screening, negotiation, merger restructure and consent orders-display
an impressive promptness by government officials. The entire resolution
process is substantially shorter, and expends fewer resources, than the
alternative-traditional, protracted litigation. The relative speed at
which the system operates reduces the process costs of each proposed
merger and consequently reduces costs for all proposed mergers.254
253. Bush, supra note 252, at 921-62.
Although the evolution of the Antitrust Division from enforcement agency to economic regulator
can be described, the motivations that drive and shape the Division's policy and procedure have not
been widely studied in the political economy literature, see, e.g., J. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REG-
ULATION 123 (1980). Understanding regulatory behavior and decisionmaking at the Antitrust Divi-
sion requires an appreciation of the interaction of many constraints.
First, because the Division is part of the executive branch, it is subject to the political agenda and
environment set by the administration. Second, statutory and legislative limits and pressures from
congressional oversight committees, especially in the budgetary process, constrain the Division's
conduct. Third, when the Division files suit, it is subject to judicial checks; although, it exercises
broad prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether or not to sue. Fourth, the leadership exercised by
the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General and the strength of opinions held by each,
influence the Division's behavior to varying degrees.
Numerous examples of motivating factors are described above, but three seem critical to the pres-
ent regulatory posture over mergers. Congressional passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1976 prompted the Division to assume a regulatory role. An executive branch
desire to reduce the confrontational and adversarial nature of enforcement motivated the "fix it first"
policy. A desire for less government intervention in capital markets is also another frequent theme.
These institutional, political, and operating constraints played a significant role in shaping the Divi-
sion's perception of the "public welfare" and enforcement. Other commentators have noted similar
constraints and incentives at work in other agencies. See generally K. CLARKSON & W. MURIS, THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: ECONOMIC REGULATION AND BUREAUCRATIC BE-
HAVIOR (1981); R. Katzman, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
AND ANTITRUST POLICY (1980); Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation and Deregulation: The Polit-
ical Foundations ofAgency Clientele Relationships, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 148 (1981); Wein-
gast & Moran, Bureaucratic Control: Regulation Policy Making By the Federal Trade Commission,
91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983); Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent
Perspective With Applications to the SEC (Working Paper No. 86), Center for the Study of American
Business, Washington University, St. Louis; Grier, Congressional Preference and Federal Reserve
Policy (Working paper No. 95), Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University,
St. Louis.
254. See Barnette, The Importance ofAlternative Dispute Resolution Reducing Litigation Costs as
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Minimizing delay increases public confidence in the process. Court
dockets are freed for other important matters, including those few
merger cases that can not be settled. As a result, the perceived legiti-
macy of the system is enhanced with a concomittant increase in deter-
rence. The relative clarity of substantive merger law as set forth in the
Guidelines, in comparison to the ambiguities of the case law, also fosters
deterrence. 255 To the extent that legal standards are clearly stated,
promptly enforced, and backed by adequate deterrence, the efficiency or
utility of law is maximized.
Despite the efficiency of the present merger process, not everyone ac-
cepts its utility.256 Generally, opponents of alternative dispute resolution
strenuously oppose any move away from full adjudication.25 7 One oppo-
nent, Professor Fiss has put forth the most forceful arguments, albeit
without empirical support. Fiss criticizes alternative dispute resolution
in general and the movement toward settlement, asserting that: 1) a rela-
tive imbalance of power between the parties may force unfair resolutions,
2) settlements are often reached without authoritative consent because of
imperfect representation, 3) the absence of a judicial record impairs the
enforcement of settlements, and 4) peace rather than justice is
achieved.2"' Although Fiss' arguments were not specifically criticizing
merger settlements, each of his general criticisms lacks force when ap-
plied to public enforcement of merger regulations.
First, the argument that settlements only achieve justice for the
wealthy presupposes disparity in wealth between the disputants.259 Be-
cause the Department of Justice is enforcing the merger laws and large
corporations are defending the proposed mergers, the relative imbalance
a Corporate Objective, 53 ANTITRuST L.J. 277, 278 (1984); see also Bush, supra note 252, at 909;
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29, 32-34 (1972).
255. Whether the Guidelines actually alter the substantive case law is a question beyond the
scope of this Article. See generally supra note 233.
256. See generally supra note 233.
257. See, e.g., Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 668 (1986); Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Fiss,
Against Settlement]; Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Fiss, Eden];
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982). See also Chayes, The Role of Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). But see McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconcilia-
tion, 94 YALE L.J. 16660 (1985).
258. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 257; Fiss, Eden, supra note 257.
259. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 257, at 1076. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976) (the acquiring
person must have total assets or annual net sales of $100 million and must be acquiring voting
securities or assets of a manufacturing person with annual net sales or assets of $10 million, or a non-
manufacturing person with assets of $10 million).
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of power seems insignificant. Merger disputes rarely, if ever, involve in-
digents, who might be especially vulnerable. Nor does either party have
preferred access to resources and information regarding the merger.
Second, authoritative consent of the parties does not seem problematic
in the merger context. In addition, Fiss has not advanced any evidence,
empirical or otherwise, to support this general argument in the litigation,
context. Corporations have not charged conflicts of interest between
themselves and their representatives in the settlement proceedings. Cor-
porations involved in antitrust merger matters tend to hire competent
experts in the field as counsel. Inside corporate counsel work closely
with retained counsel to effectuate the corporate client's desires. Sophis-
ticated business executives and lawyers, who are able to respond quickly
to the Division's requests and objections, comprise most merger teams.
Many actors in today's corporate arena agree that a fundamental corpo-
rate objective should be the avoidance of litigation.26° Thus, there is no
discernable reason why counsel should not pursue alternative means to
resolve merger disputes. The evidence concerning mergers suggests that
the parties are doing just that-negotiating and settling, rather than liti-
gating, the conflicts that do arise.261
Third, the absence of a judicial record is irrelevant in the preclearance
screening process. The parties must submit to the Antitrust Division all
relevant financial and economic data required by the Hart-Scott-Rodino
disclosure provisions. The Division may set forth its understanding of
the conditions and terms of merger in a business review letter. In addi-
tion the parties may set forth their agreement and understanding in a
consent decree.262 These records provide a factual basis upon which sub-
sequent enforcement actions can be based.
Finally, Fiss asserts that settlements result in peace but not necessarily
justice.2 63 He opines that the purposes of adjudication are broader than
the resolution of the parties' conflict. According to Fiss, adjudication
provides a forum for articulating and effectuating through the participa-
tion of the judge important values "embodied in the substantive law."
Although few public enforcement suits are actually filed in the merger
260. Irving Shapiro, former Chairman of DuPont, is reported to have said: "Anyone with expe-
rience in major litigation knows that the cost and wear and tear of litigation are no longer accepta-
ble. Alternative means of resolving problems have to be found." Barnette, supra note 254, at 277.
261. See supra § III.D.
262. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1986); 16 C.F.R. § 2.31 (1986).
263. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 257, at 1075. Contra, Menkel-Meadow, supra note 246,
at 499.
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area,2" the Department of Justice is charged with responsibility of en-
forcing the law. To date no one has argued or documented that the Anti-
trust Division has established and enforced the merger Guidelines for the
purpose of withdrawing mergers from judicial review or minimizing a
perceived "activism" by the judiciary.265 Furthermore, a private cause of
action exists for challenging illegal mergers.266 Thus, a judicial forum is
available in the event the Department abrogates its responsibilities or in
the event the parties cannot reach a settlement. Moreover, a negotiated
settlement is not inherently unjust; settlements that satisfy both sides
may be more just than uncompromising court mandates.
In short, the Antitrust Division's "regulatory conduct" is unquestiona-
bly more prompt, less costly and more efficient than full-blown adjudica-
tory proceedings. The prescreening clearance process is appropriately
suited for review of proposed mergers. It avoids the attendant costs of
litigation for the merging parties, the Antitrust Division and the courts.
From a policy standpoint, the present review process is in most cases a
more effective means of resolving merger issues. In this context, the
goals of efficiency, justice, and legitimacy need not compete; each can be
pursued simultaneously. Efficiency need not diminish the quantity of the
justice or the legitimacy of the process.
V. CONCLUSION
The evolution of the Antitrust Division into an economic regulator is
logical. At its roots, the legislative history of the antitrust laws shows a
264. See supra § III.
265. See Fiss, Eden, supra note 257, at 1670.
266. The Supreme Court has established several antitrust doctrines that may bar a competitor
from challenging a proposed merger. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477
(1977) (antitrust injury); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 55 U.S.L.W. 4027 (U.S. Dec. 9,
1986) (standing); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C. 1984) (stand-
ing. See also Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1984); Hovenkamp, Merger
Actions for Damages, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 937 (1984); Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust:
A Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEX. L. REv. 41 (1984). But see White Consol. Indus., Inc. v.
Whirlpool Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. Ohio), vacated, 619 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ohio 1985),
aff'd. 781 F.2d 1224 (6th Cir. 1986); Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co.,
660 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1155 (1985)
(cases brought and won by competitors after government clearance of the merger).
In Cargill, the Supreme Court held that Brunswick's antitrust injury test applies to private plain-
tiffs seeking injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act and that loss or injury due to increased
competition does not constitute antitrust injury. Cargill, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4032.
Of the antitrust suits filed, for which a final disposition is known, 88% were settled without final
adjudication. Salop & White, supra note 240, at 1011.
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nonregulatory concept for the Department of Justice, but it also shows,
at least in part, a noneconomic view of the antitrust laws.267 Thus, the
early focus on individual behavior was quite appropriate; but once the
Department took a more global, economic view of antitrust, antitrust
enforcement became a process of controlling and adjusting the economic
aspects of markets. And, that is what regulatory agencies traditionally
do-tinker with the market as a whole. The panoply of merger proce-
dures utilized by the Antitrust Division facilitates this economic
regulation.
The Antitrust Division's present merger review procedures are cost
efficient. The Division employs several procedures to regulate mergers
including: 1) setting merger standards and guidelines, 2) reviewing mar-
ket data submitted through required disclosure provisions, 3) establish-
ing a preclearance screening process, 4) suggesting and negotiating
merger restructures, and 5) joining in curative, or divestment, consent
orders.
The dichotomy lies in the fact that, as the Antitrust Division has
evolved from a traditional, litigation-oriented enforcement agency to that
of a regulatory agency, it has done so without clear congressional ap-
proval or directive. It is clear that the original intention of Congress,
when adopting the Sherman and Clayton Acts, was not to create in the
Department of Justice a regulatory agency over mergers. The present
regulatory posture permitting preclearance approval of mergers was spe-
cifically proposed by Senator Cummins in 1913 and rejected by President
Wilson and the 1914 Congress that passed the Clayton Act. Subse-
quently Congress has sanctioned or ratified, at least implicitly, this en-
forcement transition, although Congress may well be unaware of the
impact of this change. The change is not merely procedural; it implicates
enforcement policy, compliance incentives, and the substantive law of
mergers. It also can accommodate various divergent ideologies. From
both efficiency and procedural perspectives, the gains are many.
267. See, eg., Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
1140 (1981); Lande, Wealth Transfers As The Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Effi-
ciency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982); Pitofsky, The Political Content of
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979); Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of
Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEo. L.J. 1511 (1984); Schwartz, "Justice"
and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979); Sullivan, The Eco-
nomic Jurisprudence of the Burger Court's Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1 (1982); Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are The
Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214 (1977).
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APPENDIX
NUMBER AND VALUES OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
1968-1986
No. of Index Percent
Trans. (1980= 100) change
4,462 236
6,107 323 +37%
5,152 273 -16%
4,608 243 -11%
4,801 254 +4%
4,040 214 -16%
Year
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
-29%
-20%
-1%
-2%
-5%
+1%
-11%
+27%
-2%
Reported
Value of
Trans.*
43,600
23,700
16,400
12,600
16,700
16,700
12,500
11,800
20,030
21,937
34,180
43,535
44,346
82,618
53,755
Index
(1980= 100)
98
53
37
28
38
38
28
27
45
49
77
98
100
186
121
1983 2,533 134 +7% 73,081 165
1984 2,543 135 +1% 122,224 276
1985 3,001 159 +18% 179,600 405
1986 3,356 178 +12% 176,600 398
*Millions of dollars
Source: W.T. GRIMM & CO., MERGERSTAT REviEw (compiled from data covering 1968-1986).
The values in column 5 include only those values reported by the parties to the acquisition; they
represent between 32-50% of all merger transactions. Values to other transactions were not
reported. They also include only transactions with a minimum value of $500,000. The initial
reporting threshold under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act is $15 million or 15% of the value of the assets
or securities of the acquired firm.
2,861 152
2,297 122
2,276 144
2,224 118
2,106 111
2,128 112
1,889 100
2,395 127
2,346 125
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